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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STA1'E OF UTAH 
(:,\HY HANSEN, et al., for himself 
and for and on behalf of 191 other 
1wrsons similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
VS. 
BR(YrHEHHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE 
FJRKMEN AND ENG INEMEN and 
844 of BROTHERHOOD OF 






BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIYE FIREMEN AND 
ENGINEMEN and LODGE 844 of BROTHERHOOD 
OF LOCOMOTIVE FIREMEN AND ENGINEMEN 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
ri1his is an action commenced by Gary S. Hansen 
and others for themselves and "for and on behalf of 
191 other persons similarly situated" seeking damages 
against defendants based upon alleged contracts and 
brt>aches of fiduciary duty. 
1 
DI8POSrl'ION lN 'l1HE LUWER coe1n 
The case was tried to the court without a jury ani\ 
the court found for plaintiffs. The ruling of the 
court was bast,1d upon its findings of fact and eonclus1·0 . 
of law filed and entered herein in the record at 
579 through 595. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek a reversal of the judgment in the 
lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action arose out of a National Labor Relations 
Board (herein referred to as "NLRB") election cam-
paign wherein the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen 
and Enginemen (herein called "BLF&E" or "Brot11er-
hood") was seeking collective-bargaining rights of a 
group of employees at the Kennecott Copper Mine. The 
contract of these employees was held at that time by 
Local 485 of the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union 
(herein referred to as "Mine-Mill"). The campaign be-
gan in the middle part of September, 1966, and ran 
through the 21st of June, 1967. 
From the beginning, in September 1966, through 
February or March, 1967, organizers working for the 
Brotherhood solicited membership from the group then 
represented by Mine-Mill. Among the numerous benefits 
of the Brotherhood which were advertised in the solici-
tation were the constitutional provisions regarding strike 
2 
Grnd'it payments. Employees who joined during this 
iiHw \\'(•re i>romised strike benefits according to the Con-
stitution of the Brotherhood if they would join and vote 
for the Brotherhood in this campaign. 
From and after February 1, and possibly as late 
March 24, 1967, some of the organizers involved locally 
represented that strike benefits would be paid to those 
who joined the union, regardless of the outcome of the 
NLRB election. 
Tlw NLRB e>lection was held on .June 22, 1967, and 
the BL F&g lost. Subsequently, Mine-Mill was again 
certified as the bargaining representative of a unit in-
cluding plaintiffs herein. The BLF&E has never at any 
tinw bt>en bargaining agent for said unit. 
On .f nly 14 and 15, 1967, a strike was instituted at 
Kennecott Copper Corporation properties by all of the 
unions involyed The BLF&E called the members in its 
bargaining nnit on strike per an authorization by Presi-
dent Gilbert at 12 :01 p.m., July 15, 1967. (Exhibit P-138, 
R. 798.) Prior to that time, some of the other unions had 
institutPd their strike. (R. 797; R. 963.) 
On or about July 31 or August 1, 1967, the first 
BLF&E strike benefit payroll was prepared and sub-
mitted to the Grand Lodge. This payroll contained the 
names of the plaintiffs in this action, under erroneous 
,job classifications expressly contra to a letter of in-
t-;truction received by Martin Jensen from R. R. Bryant, 
3 
Exhibit D-HH, and PXlll'Pssly contra tht• instruetiow; r
11 
the blank payroll forms sent out h>- th(' Brotlil·rhooJ 
Exhibit P-78. This 1iayroll was n·ject<·d hy J>l'l':-;i<fon; 
G i llwrt and retm·ned to thC' Local Lodg(' with ti!\• in 
structions that only those uwmlwrs of the Brotherhow\ 
in tht> bargaining nnit r<'JJn·se11f('(l hy tli<> HL:F'&:E anil 
covt>red by the> contract at KennPcott should be ineludr·d 
on it. 
Suhs<>qnently, a revist>d payroll wa:s S!·nt to thP 
Brotlwrhood which did not contain tlw 1rn11ws of tJ:,. 
plaintiffs in this action. That pa>-roll was paid. Plain-
tiffs in this action did not receive strik<> lwrn•fits at am 
time during tlu• strike>. 
PrC'sident GilbPrt of the Grand Lo!lgP, RLF&:E. in-
formed Lodge 8-±4 and tlw plaintiffs of his int!'rprf'ta-
tion of the Constitution whieh forhad paymPnt of strike 
bc>nefits to these plaintiffs. H<> also infomwcl them at 
this time that their only re>medies W('l'l': ( 1) An appral 
to the Convention; (2) A pl<•a to tlw Financ(' Co1mnittPP 
for special assistance. (R. 1243-45.) 
Subsequently, a pl<'a was instituted to tlw Finanr0 
Conunittee of the Grand Lodge of the BLF&:E. Tlw 
FinancP CommittPP vokd 5 against and :1 for 
of special strike assistance. (Exhihit P-29.) Tlwn•fore, 
no strike assistance was authorized for t}wse 
However the Finance Conunitt<>e did autlioriz<' a11 ' 
amount of $10,000 to ht> paid into a spPrial fund for 
hardship ca:ws among tlwsl' iwopl<>. (Exl1ihit 
4 
<li<l llot make· an ap1H·al to th<· Conven-
11,,11 ,ii· llw Broth<·rltood on th<· intPrpretation placed 
npnn tl\(' Constitution hy Presid<>nt GilhPrt. (R. 765; 
t ) IC 
Dnring the m<>mlwrsl1ip campaign, each member 
was gi\'(•n a copy of tlw Constitution or a copy 
\':a:-: !llacl<· n·adii.'· availahlP to him. (R. 1060-61.) 
POINT I 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT UPON WHICH THE 
JlTDG:'IIENT BELOW IS BASED ARE NOT SUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
TliP trial eonrt PlT('d in its first finding of fact that 
plaintiff .James Oliver was a member of de-
frnrlant union at thf' timP of tlw strike involved in this 
Tlt1•rp is nneontradich•d evidPnce from the records 
of clPfrndants to the contrary. (R. 998; R. 924; R. 938; 
Exhihit D-rnO.) Exhihit D-190, which was admitted as 
!'Yid(•nce, indicat<'s that Mr. Oliver was never a member 
of <lµfrndant unions. This exhibit was prepared from the 
r1·<"<>rcb of tlw BLF&:E bv Martin .J Pnsen, Financial Sec-
rdary of the Local. (R. 1253-54.) Further, Oliver's name 
<lot's not ap1war on the initial strike pa.'·roll, Exhibit 
P-i.\ or on the depC'ndant's lists, Exhibit P-75 and P-76. 
ThP only <>videneP presented by Oliver was his testimony 
that lit> signt>d sonw papers. He gave no proof of making 
nny chws paynwllb and tlw records show he made none. 
rl'l1P court's first finding of fact that Heriberto 
F.sqniwl is a proper plaintiff is not supported by the 
pleadings. The record in this case indicates clearlr ti 
J - iat 
this man never intervened as a I)laintiff TJ1" f"i -• - •, nat 
notice of joinder and representation of plaintiffs filed 
by counsel for plaintiffs was filed on the 24th of Mai-
1968. This notice contained a list of all the 1iarties 
were plaintiffs in Exhibit I, Part A, attached thereto, 
and it also contained a list of all those possible plain-
tiffs who had not intervened as Exhibit I, Part B. Thf: 
name of Heriberto Esquivel is found on Exhibit I, Part 
B, indicating that he had not interven0d as of that time. 
(R. 232-41.) There were no interventions after that time. 
Part of the court's sixth finding of fact if' not sup-
ported by the evidence. The evidence is clear that the 
Constitution of the BLF&E itself conditions paymrnt of 
strike benefits and prohibits the granting of strike bene-
fits to members not in the bargaining unit represented 
by the union. (Exhibit P-1, pages 195 through 199; R. 
781-82.) Further, there is evid0nce in the record in 
this case that organizers of defendants did condition 
strike benefits offered to plaintiffs as provided in the 
Constitution of the BLF&E. (Exhibits D-152; D-160: 
D-162.) 
In addition, as shown by Exhibit D-190, most of the 
plaintiffs had already become membE'rs of th<:> BLF&E 
prior to the time any representations were made by any-
one regarding strike benefits regardless of the outco111l' 
of the election. The evidence indicates that said rrprr-
sentations were not made until sonu_• time h<>h\'Pen FPh-
ruary 1 and March 24, 1967. (R. 697-98; R. 857: R. 891.l 
Thus, these representations are wholly irr<>lt•\·ant and 
6 
irnuiati>rial to all plaintiffs had joined previous 
10 that timP and cannot be the hasis of any recovery here. 
mnnlwr six is not supported hy evidence 
,r]wn' it states that representations were made by au-
tlwrized representatives of defendants. These repre-
sPntations \\'Pre devised solely hy L. L. Iman. There 
is not a scintilla of evidence in this record to indicate 
:rn_\' aetnal authority of Iman to make any promises in-
consish·nt with the Constitution of the BLF&E. The 
tr:"timon:· of President Gilbert is clear on the fact that 
Iman was a field representative and was empowered only 
to f'Pll and solicit members. (R. 724.) He was 
not (·llq>owered to interpret the Constitution of the 
BrothPrliood, nor was he empowered to make promises 
ultm riff,· the Constitution of the Broth(='rhood. (R. 761.) 
Constitntion of the BLF&E, Article 16. (Exhibit P-1.) 
Any so-ealled authority which he possessed was, by his 
own admission, based upon his own notions and ideas 
of \rhat sltonld he done (R. 1159-61; 1176.) Even the 
P\'idence of plaintiffs in this action proves this. Mr. 
'T'rnjillo, one of the plaintiffs and formerly a special 
gr·neral organizer for the Brotherhood, indicated in his 
tP8timony that he suggested to Mr. Iman the use of the 
word ''gnarantee" since "these peope" had r(='Ceived so 
many promises they "are sick and tired of promises." 
Mr. Iman then proceeded without authority from the 
Grand Lodge to use the word "guarantee" in his fliers 
and im;tructffi the special general organizers to use 
this term in their solicitation. (R. 1100.) This evidence 
dearly shows that Iman was taking instructions from 
no onp in the Grand Lodge, but had simply taken unto 
7 
himself the authority to make these prornist'S and guar 
an tees. (R. 1160-62.) There is no evidence to the c . on 
trary to be found in the record. 
The seventh finding of fact entered by the comi. 
below is in error in holding that plaintiffs Gene A. 
Beck, D. P. Bennett, Glen Bennett, Carter, James, Ken-
drick, Tsutsui, Gale and T. N. Turner were indncf'd by 
or relied upon any offers or representations or gnaran-
tees of defendants. These plaintiffs did not apvear at 
trial, they did not testify, they did not answer intrrroga-
tories of defendants, and further, they were specifically 
excluded from a stipulation entered into by counsel for 
both plaintiffs and defendants regarding evidence of a 
contract and evidence of reliance. In this stipulation, 
found in the record at pages 1060 through 10G2, the 
parties stipulated to certain evidence in order to shorten 
the time of the trial. At that time Mr. Rooker, connsfl 
for plaintiffs, made the following statement: 
The foregoing stipulation does not apply to 
testimonv that would be adduced from the follmr-
plaintiffs if they were called: Gene A. 
Beck, D. P. Bennett, Glen Bennett, Carter, .James, 
Kendrick, Tsutsui, Gale and T. N. Turner. 
As the record stands, it is completely devoid of any 
evidence whatsoever with regard to these plaintiffs. 
Thus, there is absolutely no basis in evidence for finding 
of fact number seven made by the trial court aR it 
applies to these plaintiffs. 
Them is no evidence whatever in the record to 
support finding number eight as it relates to a contract 
8 
, 11 t [1 plaintiffs Gene A. Beck, D. P. Bennett, Glen Ben-
iwit, Carter, J arnes, Kendrick, Tsutsui, Gale and T. N. 
'l'nnwr for the same reasons set forth in the immediately 
prec(•ding paragraph. 
Further, with regard to all plaintiffs, the court's 
finding of a contract in this case must have been on 
rither one of two theories. First, the facts indicate that 
hrtween September, 1966, and February 1, 1967 (at 
tlrn rarliest, and possibly as late as March 24, 1967), 
organizPrs of the BLF&E solicited members making 
promises, including promises of strike benefits based 
upon the Constitution of the BLF&E. There is no evi-
dencr of any other representations as to strike benefits 
dnring this time. If any offer was made to constitute 
a contract based upon the BLF&E Constitution, these 
promises must be considered the off er and joining the 
BLF&E must be considered the acceptance. 
The second possible theory of contract must be 
that a contract was entered into which is not based 
upon the BLF&E Constitution. According to the evi-
drnce, such an off er could be construed from the state-
ments made from and after February 1, 1967, and pos-
sibly as late March 24, 1967. (R. 1181; R. 1060-62; R. 
889-92.) At that time, some of those people solicited 
were promised strike benefits regardless of the outcome 
of the NLRB election. Authority for such an offer can-
not be found within the Constitution of the BLF&E. Ac-
ceptance of this offer by joining the BLF&E (if it could 
be a basis for a contract action against the Brotherhood) 
would apply only to those members who joined as a 
9 
result of the offer. Members '.Vho joined prior to 
111
1' 
above dates ean in no way be said to havP aecPpted tlll, 
off er made after they joined. Hence, nnd('J' tl1is eoii. 
tract theory, only those members who joined afhr t]i
1
, 
offer was made can rely upon it as a basis for contrcir-. 
tnal recovery. rrhe dates of membership of each of 
plruntiffs in this action are set forth on the exJ1ihit intro. 
duced through Martin Jens en and accepted in <'vidr,nce 
as Exhibit D-190. 
From the above, it can be seen that finding mm1. 
ber eight entered by the court cannot possibl>· hP based 
upon the evidence. If the contract is based 11pon th1, 
Constitution of the BLF&E, then the plaintiffs arP also 
subject to the rest of the proyisions of the Constitution 
which do not allow recover>·· BLF&R Constitution 
10, Section 3(a); Article 10, Section 3(e), (ExJ1ihitP-l, 
pp. 195-97). If the contract is based upon the uncondi-
tional guarantee allegedly made by agents of defend-
ants, then only those who joined the union after this 
promise was made can recover. All of the plaintiffs could 
not possibly recover since most of them joined the union 
prior to the time of this latter promise. 
The schedule attached as Exhibit B (plaintiffs' Ex-
hibit P-54 herein) to the court's finding number nine can 
have no relevance unless the court adopts a contraet 
theory based upon that document and similar 
The evidence clearly shows that the document was not 
distributed and the promises we re not made until after 
February 1, 1967. (R. 889-92; R. 1060-G2; R. l 181.) An» 
such promises, including the promise made in B 
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attaclt<·11 to findi11µ; mrn1hn r:irn· ('an only apply to those 
or tlt<· BL F&E 1"110 joim·cl from and after 
8pjil'oXi11ta t<·ly F<'l1nrnry 1. 19(i7. 1-'hey havP no rele-
\<1lH'P wliatsoe\·pr \\·ith res1>ect to those members who 
in·rP already in the union at that tinw. Thus, such prom-
C"annot lw tlw basis for recovery herein as to those 
plaintiffs. 
Tlw finding mad<' by the lower court in its finding 
nnmlwr tPn is contrary to the uncontradicted evidence in 
this rrcorcl. Tlw only person in the organization of the 
DLr'&E anthorized to approve a strike is its president. 
Constitution of the BLF&E, Article 9, Section 16; Article 
Si>dion ::20(.i); (Exhibits P-1.) He testified that he 
('UllPd n strib· of tl10sP mPn in the bargaining unit repre-
hy the BLF&E ( R. 79-1-95). He furtlwr testified 
that llnd<·r the union law he had no authority to call 
a strih of pc·ople who were not represented by the 
BLF& 11 lw t>vidt>nce clParly shows that plaintiffs in 
this action were not and neYer have been represented 
bY the Brotherhood. (R. 1123-24.) The evidence shows 
that authority to strike granted plaintiffs in this 
;1dion 1rns granted by the Mim•-Mill union which repre-
sented t!H•m at thP time. (R. 1223-24.) 
Tlw court's fincling numbt>r twelve is contrary to 
tlw P\ i<lrnce in that it states that the strike benefit pay-
roll of .T uly, 1967, which included the plaintiffs, was a 
rnli(l and duly-authorized payroll. The uncontradicted 
c•rideneP dPmonstrates that this payroll was invalid be-
causp it containt>d names of people not in the bargaining 
nnit rt>presented by the defendants contrary to express 
11 
instructions givn to Martin Jensen by letter of July 2: 
• J, 
1967, and also contrary to express instructions found on 
the bank payroll forms npon which the payroll was suli. 
mitted. Both this letter and the instructiorn-; on the 
forms indicate that only names of men in the bargainging 
units represented by the BLF&E should be included on 
the payroll. (Exhibits P-78 and D-191.) 
U ncontradicted testimony of Martin Jensen, Secre. 
tary of the Local BLF&E, indicates that he placed plain-
tiffs' names on this payroll knowing they were not lllPlll-
bers of the bargaining unit represented by the BLF&E 
and further that he placed these plaintiffs in erronE'Ons 
job classifications so as to include them on the payroll. 
(R. 1145-46.) This payroll was held to be invalid h!' 
the president of the BLF&E for these reasons. This was 
his duty under the Constitution of the BLF&E. 
The court's finding number fourteen is in Prror be-
cause it is contrary to the evidence in Pxhibit form which 
1 
indicates that plaintiffs were not com1wlled to seek out-
side employment by any act of defendants, Lnt were 
compelled to seek outside employment by the Constitu- 1 
ti on of the BLF&E in Article 10, Section 3 ( i). 
P-1, pp. 197-98.) 
Finding number fifteen entered by the court hdow 
is contrary to the evidence since undisputed evidence 
from the records of the BLF&E shows that plaintiff 
Oliver was never a member of the BLF&E. (I£xhibit D-
190; R. 924; R. 932; R. 938.) Further, the nndisputerl 
evidence in the case shows that membPrs of the BL1',&E 
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not iJl a hnrµ;nininµ; unit represented by the BLF&E do 
not t·njoy the same benefits of memh<'rship as do members 
wJio an' in a bargaining unit by the BLF&E. 
(R. rn:1-R-1; ExJ1ibit P-1.) Thus, these plaintiffs were 
not entitk·d to all of the benPfits available to members 
of the BLF&E in a bargaining unit represented by the 
BLF&E. 
Findng number sixteen by the court below is entirely 
without supporting evidence with regard to whether 
strike bent>fits were knowingly paid by defendants to 
mm ontside of the bargaining unit represented by the 
BLF&K The evidt>nce indcates that some of the men 
on tlw strike payroll may have been listed in erroneous 
joh cla:-:sifiC'ations and in this respect may have received 
hendits wlwn they should not have received them. (R. 
920; 926-27.) There is no evidence, however, to indicate 
that the BLF&E knowingly paid strke benefits to anyone 
outside of a bargaining unit which it represented. 
ThE>re is no evidence in the record to support the 
court's fnding number seventeen. Plaintiffs at no time 
introdnced any competent evidence with respect to out-
::-idt> Parnings of other people who had been paid strike 
lwnefits. Further, plaintiffs introduced no competent 
evidence respect inquiry made by the Grand Lodge as 
to outside earnings of those members receiving strike 
benefits during the strike. In addition, there is clear 
evidPnce found in Exhibit P-1 that the defendants had 
110 duty to make any inquiry with regard to strike benefits 
and that the duty to disclose earnings rested upon each 
inuividual member of the BLF&E. Constitution BLF&E 
Article 10, Section 3(i), (Exhibit P-1, pp. 197-98). 
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This court should be aware that finding 
eighteen originally entered by the trial court wati inodi. 
fied and practically vitiated by that conrt's additionui 
finding of fact. The additional finding of fact indicati·! 
that defendants introduced into evidence the interroga 
tories ans'.vered by most of the plaintiffs, which inter 
rogatories indicate the amount of earnings of each plain. 
tiff during the period of the strike. vVith respect to 
plaintiffs who did not answer the interrogatories, it 
the position of defendants that they cannot recover Pnn 
if the court upholds the judgment below sincP it is 
sible to compute the correct amount of said recowry. 
Parts of finding number nineteen are conclusorv 
and clearly not supported by the evidence. There is no 
evidence in this record whatsoever which would indicate 
that defendants had any fiduciary duty to pay strikr 
benefits to these plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' whole theory of 
this action has been contract. Any fiduciary duty would 
have to come from the Constitution of the BLF&E (Ex-
hibit P-1) which also contains provisions which prohhit 
the payment of strike benefts to these plaintiffs. Tha.t 
Constitution clearly creates a form of discrimination in 
the administration of strike funds, since it requires pay-
ment of strike funds to people participating in a "legal 
strike authorized by" the union and it forbids payrnPnt 1if 
strike benefits to all others, whether members or not. 
Constitution of the BLF&E Article 10, Section 3(a), 
(Exhibit P-1, p. 195.) See also Exhibit D-136 
at pp. 19-20 infra. 
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ln its J'ncling n11mlwr twe>nt>, tl1P court finds a breach 
111· i'idtwian, dnty hmsed r:pon its finding that promises 
11 ,,n• iuade to plaintffs by defendants wlwn deft>ndants 
11 di that these pro mi :,;es WP re false and that they 
ironld not pay benefits. This finding is clearly contra 
to tlw e\·idence in this case. There is no evidence what-
ev<'l' in the record that defendants or their employees ever 
kne\\' at the time these alleged unconditional promises 
11 pre made that they would not be kept. The evidence 
ekarl.v shows that the organizer who initiated the prom-
j,es, L. L. Iman, thought his interpretation of the BLF&E 
Constitution was correct. (R. 1175-76.) The evidence is 
nncontradicted in its showing that the Grand Lodge offi-
rrrs of thP BLF&E did not know these alleged uncondi-
tiunal promises were being made until well after they had 
J,epn made and tlw strike had begun and the plaintiffs had 
shown hy plaintiffs' own evidence when one of their 
11·itm'sses, Mr. Tn1jil10, stated that he was asked to 
gather up fliers after the strike had begun to send to 
PrrsidPnt Gilbert to show him what went on out here. 
(R. 1142-43.) 
Finding number twenty-one entered by the court below 
is nrnmpported by the evidence since the evidence is insuf-
fieiPnt to support a judgment on behalf of alleged plain-
tiff Esquivel (he is not a plaintiff) or on behalf of 
alleged plaintiff Oliver (he was not a member of the 
BLF&E at the time of the strike). Alleged plaintiffs Gene 
A. Beck, D. P. Bennett, Glen Bennett, Carter, James, 
Kendrick, Tsutsui, Gale and T. N. Turner have produced 
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no evidence whatsoever indicating any contract of ani 
kind between them and the BLF&E and fnrther 
have produced no evidence showing any reliance upo;
1 
promises made by the defendant BLF&E or any damaKe 
incurrt>d because of breach of contract or because of said 
reliance. Since these items are not "common questions" 
which can be· proved for all by some members of 
class, failure of these plaintiffs to adduce proof is fatal 
to their case. 
Since the crucial findings of fact upon which the 
judgment below is based are not supported by evidence, 
the judgment below should be reversed and the case 
should be remanded for findings consistent with the evi-
dence. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN CONCLUDING 
THAT A VALID CONTRACT WAS ENTERED INTO 
BY PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS BECAUSE, 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, ANY "CONTRACT" FOR 
STRIKE BENEFITS TO THESE PLAINTIFFS WAS 
ULTRA VIRES THE UNION CONSTITUTION AND 
CANNOT BE BASED UPON ANY AGENCY, 
PLIED AUTHORITY, APPARENT AUTHORITY OR 
RATIFICATION THEORY. 
Article 10, Section 3, sub-section (a) of the Consti-
tution of the BLF&E provides : 
The rate of pay to each member and non-mem-
ber engaging in a legal strike authori.zed by this 
organization shall be .... 
The terms "legal strike authorized by this organiza-
tion" are words of art as mwd in the context of labor-
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11 1<11wgellH'nt n'1atlons. Sl'etion S(h)-4(ii) (c), 29 U.S.C. 
'.]CJ,C.:(ll)(4)(ii)(c), of th(' National Labor Relations Act 
as mnend('d iirovides tliat it is an nnfair labor practice 
to fore<-' or reqmre 
... an)- ernplO_\'C'l' to recognize or bargain with a 
particular lahor organization as the representa-
tive of his (_•mplo_\-ees if another labor organiza-
tion has been certified as the representative of 
sueh em1iloyt'Ps under the provisions of Section 
159 of this title .... (Emphasis added.) 
Srction !)(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. provides: 
H<·presrntativcs designated or selected for the 
1mrpose of eo1lcctive bargaining by the majority 
of tl\(' l'lllployePs in the unit appropriate for such 
1mrposes, shall be the exclusive representatives 
of all tlw Pmployees in such unit for the purposes 
of rolkctiv(' barganing in respect to rates of pay, 
wag1's, hours of employment, or other conditions 
of employment .... (Emphasis added.) 
Aftrr the certification election in June of 1967, the Mine, 
Mill and Smelter vVorkers Union, not the BLF&E, was 
thP exclusive representative of plaintiffs for the pur-
IJoses of collective bargaining concerning the terms and 
eon<litions of employment. (R. 1224.) The economic strike 
authorization and call issued by the BLF&E on July 15, 
19G7, was for the purpose of achieving better terms and 
conditions of employment for only those persons under 
thr jurisdiction of the BLF&E. (Exhibit D-186; R. 1222-
1224.) 
As set forth in Section 8 (b) ( 4) (ii) ( c) above, any con-
eertrd action on the part of a labor organization attempt-
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mg to force or require an employer to bargain with 
that organization ·when another labor organization ha, 
been certified as representative of that unit is an nnfair 
labor practice. NLRB v. Teamsters, 314 F.2d 792 (hi 
Cir. 19G3); Parks v. Atlanta Printing Pressmen, 2±3 F.2,! 
284 (5th Cir. 1957). Conseqtwntly, if the BLF&E \reri· 
to authorize or call members not within its bargainino 
unit, but within a unit held hy l\fine-1\fill, out on strike, it 
would be in express violation of this section and an 
illegal strike. NLRB v. Teamsters, supra; Park v. At 
lanta Printing Prcssnien, supra; Local 48, Slzce.t Metal 
Workers v. Hardy Corp., 332 F.2d G82 (5th Cir. 19G4). 
The BLF&E cannot use strike coercion to effect 
terms and conditions of employment of employees it does 
not represent. Plaintiffs were never represented by thP 
BLF&E. (R. 1223-24.) Hence, the BLF&E Constitution, 
when it speaks of a "legal strike" authorized by thP 
BLF&E cannot be said to encompass plaintiffs in the 
instant case. If plaintiffs were called out or anthorized 
to strike by the BLF&E, it would not be a legal strike, hut 
would be an unfair labor practice under the National 
Labor Relations Act as amended. This is the srm:e in 
which the International President, therefort>, properly 
defined those constitutionally entitled to strike benefits. 
rrhis is entirely within his power and authority. 
Plaintiffs argue that this provision entitled them 
to strike benefits even though they were not within 
bargaining unit represented by the BLF&E. claim 
that the fact that they are members of the BLF&E 
entitled them to the benefits. Plainly, this cannot be 
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tlw correct inkrJll'C'tabon of this section of the Con-
Tlw Constitution authorizes pay to members 
!/!Ill 11 011-mr'1111Jcrs Pngaging in a "leg((l strike aidhor-
icr If" the organization. There were thousands of non-
rnr•mbr:rs ontside the bargaining unit represented by the 
nLF&E l'ng·ag·ing in the same strike plaintiffs engaged 
in. Tf tlw interpretation placed upon this section by plain-
tiffs >vere correct, thP BLF&E would also be liable to 
eyen· one of them. Such an interpretation would place 
the RLF&E under contractual obligation to pay strike 
lwnefits to employee of Kennecott. Analysis re-
wals thr absurdity of plaintiffs' proposition. The intent 
of the BLF&E Constitution was clearly to limit strike 
henefits to those in a unit represented by the union and 
owT which the union had control. (R. 783-790.) 
This is the> interpretation which has been placed 
npon this article of the Constitution by those entitled to 
interprPt it tlw officials of the International Union and 
the Constitutional Convention of the Brotherhood. The 
Jll'0ceedings of the 33rd through the 39th International 
Conventions of the BLF&E show the clear intent of the 
HLF&E constitutional provision on strike benefits. As 
an example, during the 37th Convention (1959) an amend-
ment was proposed by Lodge 247 which would have pro-
vided the following: 
rrhe rate of pay to each member and non-mem-
ber engaging in a legal strike authorized by this 
organization shall be .... SAME TO INCLUDE 
ANY TIME LOST BY A MEMBER ON AC-
COUNT [Sic] HONORING A PICKET LINE 
19 
\VHERE A srrRJKE IS IN PROORES:S p. 
of tlw :nth Con_vention (1959) 
(Exlnb1t D-13G.) (Emphasis added.) ( AJnl·ndatr. 
1 . i · Jl \ anguage capita 1zed.) · 
Ob\riously, this proposed anwndrnc'nt would havr· 
applied to the plaintiffs in the instant case, since thry 
were, in fact, members honoring a picket line where 
strike is in progress as far as the BLF&E ·was eoncerned. 
Hov\rever, since this provision, in classifying those 
for strike benefits, speaks of a ''legal strike authorized 
by this organization" and the anwndment would proyide 
benefits for membPrs honoring a picket linr ·wlH·re a 
strike is in progress, it is clear that such a clnal elast1ifaa. 
tion was not previously recognized. This proposed amend 
ment was rejectPcl (Exhibit D-13G at p. 392) and it is 
therefore certain that the Conn'ntion did not to pay 
strike benefits to people not anthoriztid to strike hy the 
BLF&E. (The position of plaintiffs in this casti). 
In the same iConYention, another arnend11wnt wa' 
proposed by Lodge 810: 
\VHEN A MEMBER JS DISMISSED FIWM 
THE SER\TICJ£ OF ANY RAILROAD ... BE 
CAUSE OF HIS DECISION TO HONOR THE 
PICKET LINES OF ANY UNION WHOSl' 
MEMBERS ARE ON A LEGAL STRIKF. HE 
SHALL BE rro RECELYE COM-
PENSATION UPON rrHE BA8IN 
IS PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH (a) TH1S 
SECCJ1 ION, GOVERNING p A y M 1£ NT OF 
STRIKE DUHING AN AUTHOR-
IZED STRIKE. Prnceecling-::s of the ?i7tlt Con-
vention (1959) at :395-!JG. Exhibit D-1 :11;. (Em-
added.) 
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lliw(' irtoJ'(' tl1 is proposed mrn,ndment would have granted 
lwnrl'ii ,, to tl10s<' honoring pickd 1in<'s where the picket 
\\'t•re s<•t np hy a union in a legal strike. 
Om·<' the drafters of this amendment made a dis-
ti 11cti on hehn'en uwm hers on a legal strike (in the bar-
gaining nn it r<:>presented hy the striking union) and mem-
bers 11onoring a picket line. Ths distnction was clearly 
intcndPd to provide strike benefits in a situation apart 
from tlw normal "authorized" strike-benefits situation. 
Since the amendment was rejected, (Exhibit D-136, at 
p. it ne>cessarily follows that the Convention did not 
1risb to pay strike benefits for the honoring of picket 
lines and intended such benefits to be limited to those in 
a bargaining unit represented by the union and engaging 
in a strikt> anthorized by the Brotherhood. Based upon 
tliis 11istory, President Gilbert was constrained to inter-
]Jl'et Rt'ction 3 of Article 10 so as to exclude payment to 
plaintiffs. 
Umler the indisputably correct interpretation which 
the Conventions and the International President placed 
upon the BLF&E Constitution, it would be ultra vires 
the power of the union under its Constitution for its 
officers to pay strike benefits to those not within a 
bargaining unit it represents. If such strike benefits 
could not be paid by the union without a Constitutional 
amendment, the union certainly cannot be said to have 
ratifie(l any activity of its purported agents in making 
this off er. Neither could there be an implied authority 
o[ thesp agents to make the alleged offers nor an appar-
ent since agents of the union could never be 
said to have more authority than the union itself has. 
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This particular issue has bet>n prescntPd in sen·i:il 
cases, the first of whirh is Brotherhood of' B111·1 .. . " I 1)(1(1 
Traimncn v. Barnhill, 214 Ala. 565, 108 So. 43G (192fl). 
In the Barnhill cast>, after a prolonged strike, thP 1m,j. 
dent, the general secretary and the treasurer of the union 
decided to terminate the strike> bPnefits on tJw grounrl 
that such benefits were bankrupting the union. Plaintiff 
thereupon sued the union to recover his strike benefits. 
The constitution there involved provided for payment 
of strike benefits under sworn statements showing the 
names, occupations and length of service ''rith the com-
pany to all men "under the jurisdiction" of the lodw· 
engaged in the strike. A further section of the consti-
tution provided that the president, the general secretary 
and the treasurer, in conjunction with the vice-president 
in charge of the strike and the board of trustees, had 
the power to suspend payment of any strike benefits. 
The court, after much discussion on the subject, con-
cluded that: 
[T]he power through the prov1s10ns of the 
brotherhood law to make the decision of their own 
officials and tribunals conclusive in respect to the 
extraordinary protective fund and all its shikP 
benefits under its law ... is conclusive on the 
members, no fraud being charged. 
Thus, the constitutional provision making the decision 
of the authorities of the union conclusive as to strike 
benefits was held valid. See Annotations 47 A.L.R. 282, 
125 A.L.R. 1260. 
In the case of United Brotherhood of Carpenters if; 
Joiners of America, v. ]Jfoore, 141 S.E.2d 729 (Ya. A. Ct. 
App. 1965), a member of a local union brought an aetion 
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llw brotherhood and the local union alleging that 
Ile· was promised that if lw 1rnnld engage in a strike 
agaiust his <·rnployer the organizations would pay all his 
111 ,ressary bills during the srike. In the lower court, the 
plain ti ff was granted a verdict and the union appealed. 
was testimony in the case that a certain Mr. 
:McKinney had made promises to the employees that all 
of their bills would be rmid if they would engage in a 
strike against the employer. McKinney was a representa-
tive of the brotherhood sent to aid the local in the strike. 
The plaintff claimed that McKinney was merely the 
alter-ego of the president of the brotherhood. His creden-
tials card was signed by the president of the brotherhood 
and the card stated that McKinney was a representative 
of th(' president. The dnties of McKinney included organ-
izing, negotiating contracts, settling grievances and arbi-
trations. Dnring one of the local meetings, McKinney 
was asked about benefits in case of a strike. It was here 
that he allegedly made the promise that the union would 
takP care of any bills the members had. There was fur-
thPr testirnony by the plaintiff that McKinney made it 
plain that "he was the boss of the thing." 
After commencement of the strike, McKinney, along 
with people from the local union filled out and mailed, 
in accord with the constitution, the strike payroll. The 
international sent a certain amount of money to the local 
for distribution. This money was distributed and plain-
tiff recPived strike benefits in the amount of approxi-
mately $300.00. However, he alleged that this was not 
rnfficient to cover his bills and expenses incurred. As 
the continued, the local asked for more money and 
it was denied these funds by the international. The court 
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concluded that there was sufficient evidencp introdnf'irl 
as to tht> question of the promise made by M('Kimit: 
to uphold a jury verdict. However, the controlli 11y qne.,_ 
ion was a question of law: Whether M cK in11cy had 111,, 
authority to bind the lJrothcrhood in this manner. 
court held that the brotherhood, being a \"oluntary umn-
corporated association, the rights and privileges and 
obligations and duties of the association and its rnembets 
must be found in its constitution and laws. Plaintiff 
alleged that the reference in various provisions of the 
constitution to strike pay and strike benefits indica!P<l an 
implied power to promise such benefits. HmrPver, the 
provision of the constitution relied upon stated: 
"In the case of a strike or lock-out, wlwre imme-
diate aid is required, the General President, Gen-
eral Secretary and General Treasurer shall he 
vested with power to appropriate such sums as, in 
their j1ldgment, they deem advisable to meet tl1t 
particular demands, and until such time as tlw 
General Secretary can act upon the same throng-11 
correspondence with the General Krccuticc 
Board." (Italics by the Court.) 
Under this provision, the court concluded that tlw 
officers, jointly, could act and grant and prowise strike 
benefits. However, the court conclndPd tl1e officers conld 
not act alone. Therefore, since the presid0nt could 
not have granted or validly promised strike benefits, 
representative could not be said to have any authority. 
either direct, implied or apparent, to make such 
Hence, the appellate court reversed the lower court for 
refusing to strike plaintiff's e\·jdence on tlte ground that 
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1111 pb\1t1 i [' had not prov(·d t1iat had author-
it>' (o rnab• t1w lll'orni:-;('s C'lai11H•d hy plaintiff. 
TIY .lfoore casP is V('ry analogous to the instant case. 
l f, in fad, Iman the prnrnisvs which plaintiffs' evi-
d(•lJC'(' irnli('atPs he rna(h•, tlH' controlling question is a 
qn(':-:tion of' law: \Vhdher Iman had authority to bind 
tlw Broth(']'hooc1 in that manner. As set forth above at 
pag'(•s 1±-J 3, the BLF&E Constitutional Convention and 
Pre:-:ident Uilhert had interpreted the Constitution so as 
to dPny lwndits to persons in the position of tlwse plain-
tiffc;. (Exhibit P-78; Exhibit D-191.) Since even the 
Tnkrnat!onal Presi(k•nt could not bind the union by prom-
iRing lwrn·fits to plaintiffs when they '''ere not repre-
sent!'<l hy the BT_,F&E, it is clear that Iman, an agent the 
l'i 1·si(lrnt a p1winted, conld have no such authority, ex-
pn·ss, apparent, or implied; and it is equally clear that 
rnch a prnrnisP could not be ratified by the Grand Lodge. 
In tlH• ease of Amalqamated Clothing Workers of 
Americo 1.'. Kiser, 17-± Ya. 229, 6 S.E. 2d 562 (1939), 
the \'irginia Supreme Court held that where the union 
eonstitnbon did not expressly authorize the union to 
mah a contract to pay wages to a member who should 
lose employment because of the union, any alleged con-
tract made by the union's agents in order to induce a 
member to join was invalid. In the [(is er case, an organ-
izer for the union allegedly promised plaintiff that if 
she lost her employment due to the fact that she joined 
tliP union, th<' union would pay her certain benefits. Plain-
tiff joinl'd the union and lost her employment. For a 
Ct'l'tain time the union did pay her some benefits. How-
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ever, at a later date sl1e was notified she would not 
receive any further payments. Thereupon, she instituter] 
a proceeding by filing a petition of attachment on unir!ii 
funds. The controlling issue was whether or not thp 
union had the power to make these promises and, hence, 
could grant authority for such promises to its agents. 
The court stated that it had searched the constitution 
of the union and had found no authority for the promises 
made in this case. It further stated that: 
All rights, privileges and duties of both the asso-
ciation and its members must be found in the 
constitution. We are not permitted to look else-
where for them. 
The Court went on to state that the principal-agent role 
that an agent in discharge of his duties within the scope 
of his authority, whether that authority is express or 
implied, are obligatory upon the principal without ratifi-
cation or assent on the latter's part does not apply in 
the case of unincorporated associations. The court stated: 
That rule has no application here because we are 
considering an association, not formed or existing 
for profit and one which has very limited powers 
prescribed in a definite clear, unambiguous con-
stitution. It is a democratic instrument and 
affords to all who subscribe, equal rights, privi-
leges and duties. No one is entitled to a greater 
right or privilege than his brother member. From 
such an instrument inferred or implied powers 
seldom arise as is attested by this apt language 
in International Brotherhood of Boiler Makers i. 
B. L. Wood, 162 Va. 517, 175 S.E. 45, 58: 
"* * * The doctrine of authority implied from 
ostensible authority has a very iimited applica-
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tion a:-; lwtween snch an order and a person who 
is rnernh,Tship in or claims to be a member 
of it." 
1'11e eonrt further stated that the plaintiff was bound 
b!' the constitntion of the association and became so 
honnd when she signed the application card. The court 
held that plaintiff was charged with a knowledge of the 
limited authority of the officers and agents of defendant 
based upon the contractual nature of the constitution. 
In addition, the court held that: 
A person applying for membership in a frater-
nal-benefit association is charged with the duty 
of acquainting himself with its constitution and 
and, in the absence of fraud, is conclu-
:-;iv<'ly }JI'('snm0d to know the qualifications for 
membership therein prescribed and the limitations 
thereby imposrd upon the power and authority of 
its officers, and upon subordinate lodges and their 
officers as its agents. (Emphasis added.) 
Tlw eonrt eoncluded that there being no power in the 
constitution of defendant authorizing it to enter a con-
traet with plaintiff for payment to her of benefits, such 
a contract could not be validly made. The court held 
that plaintiff: 
is hound to have known of the absence of authority 
in tlw constitution. The defendant itself not hav-
ing the power to make the contract, its agents 
u1011,ld have no implied authority to do what the 
principal itself is not empowered to do. (Emphasis 
added.) 
This rule also applies to the doctrine of ratification. 
A contract can only be ratified by the person who had 
the power to authorize it. 
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Further exponnding upon the conf'titntion of tlii· 
union in that the court held that in addition tri 
being a contract betwePn plaintiff and the union, 
constitution was a contract between plaintiff and the 
other members of the union. The fund which ,,.as de. 
rived from the other members of the association by dues 
and assessments was paid to the union as a trust fund. 
It could not be paid out except by virtue of the constitu. 
tion. The court held that looking behind the association 
as an entity, the fund really belonged to all of the, mem. 
bers. Therefore, to permit plaintiff to collect wages as 
she alleged, wonld be taking money from the fund be-
longing to all members of the union without consent of 
said members. 
As stated in the Kiser case, sitpra, every mernher of 
the union is bound by the constitution as a contractual 
obligation and is chargeable with knowledge and under-
standing of its provisions. E.g. Allen v. Southern Pacific 
Co., 166 Or. 290, 110 P.2d 933, 935 (1941); Amalgamated 
Clothing Workers v. Kiser, supra. Article 10, Section 
3 ( e) of the BLF&E Constitution provides that the pro-
visions concerning strike benefits are directory only and 
cannot be the basis for a legal liability on the part of the 
Brotherhood. Under this provision, the members who 
joined supposedly in reliance upon the promises of strike 
benefits were, not reasonable in their reliance. They 
were charged with knowledge that such provisions could 
not create legal liability Since union members are bound 
to know and have accepted the provisions of the Consti-
tution, they cannot now repudiate this specific provision 
while trvino- to rely on another provision pnrporteclly • b 
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,,r:rnting th<'m benefits. They must accept the whole 
b 
Co11sti tn b on. 
UndPr tJw cases cited above, it is clear that the 
eonstitntional and contractual obligation involved in the 
at bar prevents, by operation of law, any recovery 
by plaintiffs in the instant case. Since, under the Consti-
tution, the president himself could not authorize pay-
ment of btmefits to plaintiffs, no one could be said to 
have actual, implied or apparent authority to do so. 
Further, there could be no ratification of such conduct. 
POINT III 
NON-PROFIT ASSOCIATIONS SUCH AS LABOR 
ORGANIZATIONS ARE ACCORDED SPECIAL 
TREATMENT UNDER THE LAW AND THERE-
FORE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS GOVERN-
ING INTERNAL AFFAIRS ARE CONSIDERED 
BINDING ON ALL MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZA-
TION AND THE COURT SHOULD NOT INTERPRET 
A UNION CONSTITUTION WHERE VALID PROVI-
SIONS FOR ITS INTERPRETATION ARE PRO-
VIDED THEREIN. 
Expenditures of umon funds may only be made 
pursuant to the union constitution. Absent authorization 
under tho constitution, any payment of moneys by an 
officer of the union vwuld constitute a breach of his 
fiduciary duty under the federal Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act See Point IX, infra. 
Article 10, Section 3, of the BLF&E Constitution pro-
vidt>s for strike benefits. It further provides that the 
final authority to interpret the Constitution resides in 
the prPsident, unless he is overruled by the National 
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Convention. Const. BLF&g, Article lG, Section l(bJ, 
(Exhibit P-1). 
Union constitutions, when properly adopted, create 
a contractnal relationship between the nnion and its meni-
bers. E.g. Allen v. Southern Pacific Ry. Co., supra; Q011_ 
zales v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 298 P.2d 
(Cal. 1956); Lockridge v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street 
Electrical Railway and ill otor Coach Employees of Amer-
ica, 369 P.2d 1006 (Idaho 1962); United Glass Worker.1 
Local No. 188 v. Seitz, 399 P.2d 74 (Wash. 1965). Mem. 
hers are held to have consented to be bound by the rules 
and regulations of the union when they join the union. 
E.g. Cleveland Orchestra Committee v. Cleveland Fed-
eration of Musicians, et al., 303 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1962); 
United Glass Workers Local No. 188 v. Seitz, supra. 
Plaintiffs in the instant case allege that they have a 
contractual right to receive strike benefits pursuant to 
the Constitution of the union. It should be noted, how-
ever, that they are also contractually bound by all pro-
visions of the Constitution. Article 10, Section 3 of th" 
BLF&E Constitution authorizes the payment of strike 
benefits to members and non-members engaged in a 
"legal strike authorized by this organization." 
added.) Article 16 of the Constitution also gives thP 
International President authority to interpret the Con-
stitution. 
Furthermore, since theConstitution of the BLF&E 
creates a contract, plaintiffs are bound by Section :3(e) 
of Article 10 which provides that the article on payment 
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o!' -Jrike lH·ndits is "rliu:ctory only, and shall 11ot be the 
lin-is of ally lial>ility on the vart of the Brotherhood." 
( s added.) Members cannot now create a legal 
lwbility where they have agreed none could exist. 
In a good-faith interpretation of the Constitution, the 
president determined strike benefits could not be paid to 
plaintiffs under the Constitution. (R. 784-788.) See dis-
cussion supra, at --------· The good faith of this interpreta-
tion is shown by actions of prior Constitutional Conven-
tions, discussed, supra, at pp. 12-14. 
Additional support for the reasonableness and good 
faith of the interpretation of President Gilbert that 
strike benefits can only be paid to employees working 
nnder the jurisdiction of the BLF&E is found in the 
n·rord. Exhibit P-78, admitted into evidence at the 
rrqnest of plaintiffs, is the initial strike payroll sub-
mitted to the Grand Lodge in this case. This payroll 
contains tho names of most of the plaintiffs in this action. 
First, attention is directed to the page containing the 
of the local lodge officers and that of Mr. E. 
BrPhany of the Grand Lodge. On this page is a para-
p;raph stating: 
TAKE NOTICE! 
vV11ere chairmen approve pay-rolls for several 
lodges, they will be responsible for duplication 
of names. They must not approve two pay-rolls 
of two different Lodges whereon the same striker 
is listed twice. Regardless of what Lodge a strik-
er may be a member, his name should appear on 
the pay-roll of the Lodge under whose jurisdic-
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tion he 1ras employed u.ihcn the strikP 7 ., 11 . 
(Emphasis added.) · 
Further, attention is directed to each :shePt of th<· 
payroll whereon names of m0mlwrs have heen plaC'td 
by the local lodge. Just above these names, in bold-faet 
print, appears the following: 
To the General SecrPtary and Treasurer, Broth-
erhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen: 
The following list of names is a coned list of 
the names of striking ClllJJloyees wlw u·rre rill-
ploycd under the jurisdiction of this Lod9r in the 
service of above-named railway company at the 
beginning of this strike on said railway: (Em-
phasis added.) (Then follows list of names.) 
Both of these references makP it nnas8ailable that 
the interpretation given the plaintiffs in this ras<> is in 
good faith. That same interpretation appears from this 
printed document put out by th<> Brotlwrhood prior to 
any denial of benefits to plaintiffs. (Exhibit P-78.) 
In addition, Exhibit D-191, admittPd in e\·idence at 
the request of defendants, supports this eonstruction. 
This exhibit is a letter written by R. R. Bryant of the 
Grand Lodge to Mr. Martin Jensen, Local Lodge 844 
Secretary-Treasurer, on J nJy 25, 19G7. This letter was 
also written prior to any denial of benefits to plaintiffs, 
even prior to the submission of the strike payroll. Tht· 
pertinent part of that letter giving instructions as to 
strike payroll states: 
The names of all those represented l;.11 011r 
IJrotherhood should be listed [on tlw strike JHlY-
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roll!, provid(•cl rP:-;ponded to the strike call. 
add Pd.) 
Tt it-J ohYions from tlie aliovP-citrd exhibits that the 
110:.;ition taken hy tlw Brotherhood in this case is not 
noYel. Plaintiffs ,,·ere not in the bargaining unit repre-
:o<:>ntecl b.'· defrndants and tlwy should not have been 
on the strike vayroll. They were mistakenly listed 
11:· tlw secretary of the local lodge nnder erroneous job 
classifications. For these rea:sons, the president refused 
to allow paynwnt of benefits to them. This was his con-
titntional dnty and has always been the understanding of 
the Brotherhood. Since the constitutional interpretation 
rc>ndered to plaintiffs in the instant case was in good 
faith and entirely rPasonable, the courts should not inter-
fere with it. 
ThP right of a labor organization as a voluntary 
asso('iation to interpret and administer its rules and 
n·gnlations is jnst as sacred as the right to make such 
rrgulations, and no presumption against just and cor-
red artion should be indulged. E.g. Louisville & Nash-
ri//p Rail1ray Co. v. Miller, 219 Ind. 389, 38 N.E.2d 
i.±2 A.L.R. 1050 cert. denied, 317 U.S. 644 (1941); 
Rnrnlwrt v. U11ited Aida Aircraft & Agricitltitral Imple-
m1·11t Workers, 12 N.J. Super. 147, 79 A.2d 88 (1951). 
The courts cannot decide the wisdom or propriety of 
legitimatP by-laws of a trade union. Dyer v. Occidental 
Jjite 111.c:. Co., 182 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1950). The courts 
han frlt that they had no right to interfere with a 
ruling of a labor organization which was made within 
the limits of its constitution even though the court might 
33 
not he of the same opinion as the labor organization rr·. 
garding the merits of a controversy. E.g. Loitisvillc d 
Nashville Railway Co. v. Miller supra· llf ayo v G·i· .t ' ' · • Pa 
Lakes Greyhound Lines, 333 Mich. 205, 52 N.\V.2d 665 
(1952). 
It has aso been held that union members are bound 
by the union constitution and that the courts cannot 
resolve ambiguities in the constitution or set aside its 
provisions. E.g. Martin v. Favell, 344 Mich. 215, 73 
N.W.2d 856 (1955); Pratt v. Amalgamated Ass'n of 
Street d!; Electric Ry. Employees, 50 Utah 472, 167 Pac. 
830 ( 1917). The mere fact that several officers of tlrn 
organization have had differing opinions as to a ruling 
on a constitutional issue does not authorize a court to 
review the rulings of the regnlarly-constitnted officers 
relating to internal affairs. Such a difference of opinion 
in interpretation was said to be natural. Allen v. South-
ern Pacific Co., 166 Or. 290, 110 P.2d 933 (1941); Pratt 
v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street d!; Electrical Ry. Em-
ployees supra. The courts haye, howeYer, required that 
constitutional provisions and by-laws be reasonable and 
that they provide a Yalid mode for determining when 
relief should be given or denied. When such reasonable-
ness and validity is found, redress may not be sought 
in the courts. E.g. Allen v. Southern Pacific Co., supra; 
Lang v. International Photo Engravers Union, 343 
S.W.2d 385 (Ky. 1960); Sewell v. Detroit Elrctricnl 
Contractors' Ass'n, 75 N.W.2d 845 (Mich. 1956); Saint 
v. Pope, 211 N.Y.2d 9 (App. Div. 1961). 
This issue has been presented and decided in the 
state of Utah. In the case of Pratt v. Amalgamated .Ass'n 
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o/ Stred d'· Rlcctriwl Ry. Enq;loyr:cc:, 50 Utah 472, 1G7 
Pac. 330 (1917), th0 Utah Supreme Conrt held that it was 
noL anthorized to review the rulings of the regularly-
constitutecl officers of an association relating to the 
intPrnal affairs of that association. This case involved 
a suit hy an ex-union member alleging that he had been 
arhitrarily and illegally deprived of the right to receive 
cPrtain benefits from the union because he had been 
arbitrariy and illegally expelled from the union. Plain-
tiff had been expelled from a Philadelphia local for fail-
ure to comply with the transfer requirements of the 
llnion. "Whether or not he had been lawfully denied re-
newal of membership depended upon the construction 
given thf' constitution. The opinion of the loweT court, 
adopted by the Supreme Court, held that: 
'' [rr]he international board did have power, ex-
pressly given it in conjunction with the i1JJ.ter-
national president, to rule upon all questions of 
law [and] the manner of construction of the laws 
of the association, and did have power to suspend 
locals expressly given it by this constitution and 
these by-laws." Pratt v. Amalgamated, supra, at 
832. 
In Pratt, the local which had accepted plaintiff's 
memhersl1ip was suspended for this act. The next ques-
tion asked by the trial court was whether or not this 
power of the union had been exercised arbitrarily. Upon 
the PYidence presented, the court held that the officers 
had acted in good faith and further stated: 
"The power given these international [union] 
officers is quite arbitrary. I have no doubt it is 
necessarv to the successful maintenance of an . ' 
organization of this sort, that tlH' int<•rnat1· l 
ff.. l ona o . ieers s 10uld have. very. grrat power and 
tarnly, very grPat power is eonf errc>d upon ti : 
offieers the c-onstitution of 
association; hut there 1s nothing in the PViden. 
in this case that indieates the rwwer was 
not in good faith." Pratt ·v. Amalgamated, supra, 
at 832. 
In sustaining the verdict of the trial eourt that plaintiff 
was not entitlt•d to recover, the Supreme Comt stated: 
Courts may not interfere with the ads and pro-
ceedings of the officers of beneficial sociefas 
or asso(•iations to that extent. \Vhat tlw ('Ollrb 
are authorized to do and what tl10y will do, in 
that regard, is to compel the officers of thr snd1 
associations, and the associations to 
condemn no member and not to forfoit his prop-
erty or his property rights ·without a hearing or 
an opportunity to he heard in his ddense aceord-
ing to the laws and n1les of the association, and 
if there are no such rules the court will imply or 
create them. vVhen such an opportunity is given, 
however, and the complaining member has been 
tried and condemned or has been declared ineli-
gible in accordance with the laws and ru!Ps nf 
the order or association, and the acts of the offi-
cers of the association in that behalf are fm 
from fraud or duress, courts may not interfere. 
Pratt v. Anuzlganvatcd, suvra. at 834. 
added.) 
vVith regard to the construction of th<-' constitution hy thr 
officers of the union, the court held: 
In any event the officers not only possessed the 
right hut it was thefr duty to construe and ap-
ply the provisions of the constitution to thP hest 
of their understanding- and ability. rrlw fact that 
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diffrrent officers have arrived at different con-
clusions regarding CPrtain provisions of the con-
stitution is but natural. Pratt 1). Amalgamated, 
suz;ru, at 83-1. 
m,m·t·, it is dear under the Utah law that the court 
JtW)- not interfere in tlw legitimate operation of a trade 
union, P\'en to the extent of interpreting its constitution 
1rherc those interpreting the constitution have done so 
in good faith. There is no evidence of lack of good faith 
in tlw instant case. The court should not interfere. 
'Che Surirenw Court of Oregon, in the case of Allen 
I'. Southern Pacific Ry. Co., 110 P.2d 933 (1941), refused 
to interfere in the interpretation of a union constitution 
with rc•spect to settling grieyances and ilisputes between 
members. The con rt stated that: 
This case, therefore, comes within the well 
estahlished rule that, when the constitution and 
hr-la\\Ts of an unincorporated, voluntary associ-
ation, such as the Brotherhood, are reasonable 
and valid and provide a mode for determining 
\\-hen relief shall be given or denied to its own 
members by tribunals provided for therein, re-
(lress therefor may not be sought in the courts. 
Allen v. Southern Pacific Ry. Co., supra, at 939. 
This intf'rpretation is correct under the policy of labor 
law. 
ThP officers entitled to interpret the BLF&E Con-
:-:ti tntion made a good-faith interpretation that plaintiffs 
wen· not Pntitled to strike benefits. The trial court erred 
in fincli11g eontran- to their interpretation and its judg-
Jtwnt should h<-' n'n•rsed. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION BE-
CAUSE PLAINTIFFS DID NOT EXHAUST THEIR 
INTRA-UNION REMEDIES PROVIDED IN THE 
CONSTITUTION AND PLAINTIFFS DID NOT 
PLEAD EXHAUSTION OF REMEDY OR AN EX-
CEPTION TO THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT. 
Before union members can resort to the courts for 
relief on intra-union questions, all internal remedies must 
be exhausted. E.g. P1ttnani v. Gordon Jensen, Inc., rn 
N.W.2d 266 (Minn.1965); Duffy v. Kelly, 91 N.W.2d91fl 
(Mich. 1958). This rule has been a development of the 
common law of trade associations much the same as 
the exhaustion development in federal and state admin. 
istrative law. However, in the instant case, relianc8 
need not be placed entirely upon the common law, Article 
13, Section 9 of the BLF&E Constitution (Exhibit P-1, 
p. 251) requires members to exhaust their intra-union 
remedies before going to court. 
Article 13, Section G(c)-(t>) of the Constitution of 
the BLF&E (Exhibit P-1) provides for appeals from 
decisions of the International PrC:'sidt'nt. Generally, 
appeals can he made to the Board of Directors on an1, 
matter properly submitted. However, a decision of tlw 
International President interpreting the law of the or-
ganization is final unless it is rev<>rsed on appeal a 
Convention of the Brotherhood. In the instant case, th•1 
International President decided that the Constitntion 
prohibited payment of strike benefits to plaintiffs. (R. 
789.) Plaintiffs' remedy lay in an appeal to the Co1mn-
tion - a remedv which they did not pursm'. (R. 785.i 
Therefore, the instant action is not proper. Sec, ('.q. 
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f-Jriian v. International Alliance, 306 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. 
HlCJ7); Fray v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butchers, 
101 N.\V.2d 782 CWis. 1960). 
Casrs construing the exhaustion doctrine are legion. 
f)_'he great majority of these cases hold that a union 
memLer must indeed exhaust his intra-union remedies 
before resorting to the courts. E.g. Lear Sieglar, Inc. v. 
International Union of A.A.Ji:!. Workers, 287 F. Supp. 
G92 (\V.D. Mich. 1968); Samuelson v. Brotherhood of 
Railroad Traimncn, Rocky Mtn. Lodge No. 852, 60 Wyo. 
31G, 151 P.2d 347 (1944); Greenwood v. Building Trades 
Council, 71 Cal. App. 159, 233 Pac. 823 (1925); Minch v. 
Local Union No. 370, Internat'l Union of Operating Engi-
urers, 44 \Vash. 2d 15, 265 P.2d 286 (1953). 
[t hm; further been held that a mere claim of futility 
of pursuing internal union remedies will not suffice. 
J,ong Island City Lodge 2147 of Brotherhood of Railway 
r: 8.8. Clerks v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 217 F. 
1-lup11. 907 (1%:3). Furthennore, the provisions in labor 
nnion cont\titutions which require the exhaustion of in-
tPrnal rPmedies have generally been recognized by the 
courts as contractually binding upon the members. E.,q. 
Mooney v. B(irtenders' Pnion Local No. 284, 313 P.2d 857 
(Cal. S. Ct. 1957); Minch v. Local No. 370, Internat'l 
C11ion of Operating Engineers, sHpra; Gallagher v. Har. 
rison, G9 Ohio App. 73, SS N.E.2d 589 (1949); Way v. 
11uton, 195 Or. 36, 241 P.2d 895 (1952). 
l'hPr<· nrP, howevPr, some exceptions to the e:xhaus-
l1011 l'P<p1in•111ent. It has been held that union members 
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m'ed not exlmEst their internal remedies if sud1 l'<'lll'·l' . ' ( l f'• 
are, in fact, futile or illnsorv. Er;. Sc111lor r H,1.1-7.· . • • .. 1 • l l //fl 
11 N.J. 435, 94 A.2d 825 (1953); lValsclu' 1J. Sher/or!,: 
110 N.J. Eq. 223, l 59 A. GGl (1932); C1rn 11i119ham r. Jli//, 
Dril'<Ts <e Dairy Employees Local No. 584, 148 N.W.2rl 
114 (1955). 
In the instant case, plaintiffs had the right to aJJ]JPal 
to the ConYention of the International Union. The Con. 
vention was held in July, 19GS (R. 789) and it ·was clear!)· 
not unreasonable to require plaintiffs to abide by tlwir 
contractual agreement and present their views to this 
Convention. Such a right of appeal "Tas not illnson 
or futile in view of the fact that the plea to the FinaiirP 
Committee (R. 781-82) resulted in a 5 to 3 decision. 
(Exhibit P-28.) There is no showing on the record that 
such an appeal, if made, would not have received a fair 
and impartial hearing by the Convention. It was, there 
fore, not an undue burden upon plaintiffs to require them 
to first exhaust their intra-union remedy. 
Procedurally, the courts are in general agreement 
that a member of a voluntary association intending to 
sue that association must allege in his complaint for 
relief that he has exhausted his internal renwdies and 
that the results of that course of action are final. E.g. 
Dalton v. Plumbers & Steam Fitters Local No. 60, 122 
So. 2d 88 (La 1960); Putnam v. Gordon Jensen, Inc., 1:l9 
N .W.2d 266 (Minn. 1965); Taxicab Drivers' Local Umon 
No. 889 v. Pittman, 322 P.2d 159 (Okla. 1958); Ilickm(lll 
v. Kline, 279 P.2d 662 (Nev. 1955). Such an allegation 
is not found jn the instant complaint. (R. 1-19.) 
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'Thl' conrts which have n·quired exhaustion have also 
require<l that thP plaintiff plead with specificity so as to 
dearly indicate that the matter is ripe for adjudication. 
Jn other ·words, the mere allegation of exhaustion of 
intra-union remedies it not even sufficient to give juris-
didion to a court. E.g. Falsetti v. Local Union No. 2026, 
United Mine Workers, 400 Pa. 145, 161 A.2d 882, 87 
A.L.R.2d 1082 (1960); lVax v. Internat'l Mailers' Union, 
400 Pa. 173, lGl A.2d 603 (1960). In the instant case 
there is no indication in the complaint whether plaintiffs 
ltan; ex1rnnstecl tht>ir intra-union remedies. Since these 
intra-union remedies ·\\'ere available and have not been 
exhausted, this litigation ·was not ripe for decision by 
tlw lower court and defendants' motion to dismiss should 
Jiave heen granted. 
POINT V 
DEFENDANTS HA VE NOT WAIVED THE RIGHT 
TO LIMIT STRIKE BENEFITS TO THOSE MONTHS 
IN WHICH THE STRIKER EARNED LESS THAN 
$150.00 FROl\1 OUTSIDE SOURCES, NOR ARE THEY 
ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING THE LIMITATION. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SO 
LIMIT BENEFITS GRANTED. 
Article 10, Section 3(i) of the Constitution of the 
BLF&E provides, in part: 
·when a striking member or nonmember receiv-
ing strike benefits, is able to earn One Hundred 
Fifty Dollars ( $150.00) or more per month, it 
slwll vc his duty to notify the International 
Pn·sident, who shall thereupon request the Gen-
Pral Secretarv and Treasurer to remove the indi-
vidnal 's from the strike benefit payroll. At 
any time during the continuance of a strike, the 
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International President mav require me1nlJer·, ' . 111· 
nonmembers who are receiving strike benefit t 
furnish affidavits and other evidence 
the exact amount of their earnings from oth' 
1 t d . . e1 emp oymen urmg any given period, and th, 
International President shall have authority t 
order the withholding of further strike 
until the individual has filed the information thu.' 
required of him. On sufficient proof to justify 
such action, the International President ma11 a1;_ 
thorize the discontinuance of payments entirely 
to any member or non-member receiving strike 
benefits whose earnings from other employnunt 
equal or exceed One H wndred Fifty Dollars 
($150.00) per month. (Emphasis added.) 
This constitutional provision places an explicit duh 
on each union member to notify the International Pmi 
dent if he is making over $150.00 per month. It also 
grants the International President the right to requin, 
an appropriate affidavit from members receiving bm-
fits. This constitutional safeguard provides a means of 
conserving the union funds for the payment of strike 
benefits to those primarily in need. It also affords pro-
tection to the membership inasmuch as a protracted strike 
can result in assessment of the overall membership for 
the benefit of the striking members. This is a constitn-
tional provision and, as stated in the foregoing pointf', tlw 
members of the union are bound contractually by this 
document. 
By interrgatories to plaintiffs admitted in evidence 
(see Additional Finding of Fact by court) the Interna-
tional President has been made aware that many of 
plaintiffs earned in excess of $150.00 in some of the 
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,;( 1·ike Any n•covery granted plaintiffs by the 
lw.i'cr conrt should have respected this constitutional limi-
ta1ion which is there for the benefit of all of the members. 
Plaintiffs herein vvish to rely upon the Constitution of 
(1 1e BLF&E for henefits, and they must therefore accept 
also its burdens. They cannot pick and choose which 
constitutional provisions they will abide by. 
There is no evidence in this record indicating 
whrther defendants requested earnings information from 
those membern receiving strike benefits. Even if this 
information was not requested, such action cannot pre-
vent inquiry into plaintiffs' earnings. A custom or prac-
tice, even if it were to be so considered, does not bind 
the fntnre action of a labor organization in matters gov-
erned hy its Constitution. 
In the rase of Carey v. International Brotherhood of 
I'uzJcrmakers, 123 Misc. 680, 206 N.Y.S. 73 (Sup. Ct. 
1924), the plaintiff had run as an incumbent president 
of the Paperrnaker's Union but had lost the election. 
He brought an action to get a recount and a judicial 
dPclaration that he had been elected president. One of 
tliP questions at that trial was whether the Board of 
Canvassers had properly disallowed the votes from one 
parti('11 lar local union. The union constitution provided 
that the voting of each local be done at a single meeting. 
This provision had been violated by the local in question 
in that the voting had been done at more than one 
mreting. Plaintiff, nevertheless, contended that the votes 
sl1ould b<' counted since a custom had been rstablished 
for voting in more than one meeting. The court rejected 
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plaintiff\; contt>ntion and uph<·ld th<' Board of Can. 
vasspr's deeision to rej<c•et the votP of this particular loeRI 
noting that: ' 
_can lw <>stahlislwd violation of 
c1he pr<w1s1ons of th<> Constitnt1on. 
Other courts also l1<·l<l that custom or pradieP <JrH.,, 
not :-;up<•rsede the union eonstitution and F:.ri. 
lntenzatioila1 Brotherhood of Hll'Ctrical TVorkl'rs r. c111:i. 
mission on Cicil Rig lits, 1 ±0 Conn. 5:37, ,:\.:.'.(] :Jr;
1
; 
(195:3); Fritsch 1·. Rarbnck, l\lisc. 35<1, 
748 (Snp. Ct. 1950). 
The courts have indieatPd that aetivitiPs eontra th1 
union constitution an• ahsolukly void and cannot hr rali. 
dated evPn by the applieation of Pstopp<'l dodrinP. A1111i/-
!Janwted C1nthi11r1 H7orkers L Ki . ..:er, 17.f Ya. 220, rl 
S.E.2d 5G2 (1939). In Kiser, agPnts of dPfrndant labor 
union had J>l'OllliSPd plaintiff that if s]!P joi1wd the 11nio11 
an conseq1wntly lo::-;t lwr job def Pndant would pay lH'r an 
amount equal to ht>r regular sahu)·. Plaintiff joined the 
union, lost her joh, and tlw union did, in fad, lllah pa1-
ments to plaintiff for nearly a y0ar. 'I'lw union then 
notified plaintiff that it eonld not eontinne 'rith the'' 
payments. Plaintiff sued tlw nnion basPd upon tlii:; pr0111-
ise as a contract. In approaching this q1wstion, tl1P rour1 
first noted that: 
All rights, privileges and duties of hoth the as-
sociation and its members must be found in tli 11 
constitution. \Ve not pNmitted to look t"be-
where for them. 
The court tlwn held that th!:' offic<>rs of th<· union larked 
to make such a contract; and, eons('qtwntly, anY 
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ao·rnts of the oi'fic(•rs similarly lackPd authority. The 
"" rontract, t]wrdon•, was void. A :;;ignificant fact in Kiser 
11 as that tlw practice of making payments to plaintiff 
for m·arly a year in no way validatPd the payments. See 
Doria 1·. 11ifcrnof'l Union, Allied Industrial Workers, 16 
Cnl. Rql. :29, 19G Cal. App. 2d 22 (D.C. App. 1961); 
C11 itul Brotherhood of Car7Jenters and Joiners v. Moore, 
\'a. (1, 1-11 S.E.2d 7:29 (19G5). 
Assnrning- rir_r;1(('11do that labor organizations and 
their umstitntions slionld not be treatf•d differPntly from 
any otl1n ('()Jltrad, it ,,·ill he found that eve>n under gen-
eral prin<'iph·s of Pstoppel and \Yaiver the court could 
not (lisn'gard tlH· "ontsidP earnings'' constitutional pro-
appli<'al,k· in this case. The requiremt>nts of estop-
pd an· Si't i'ortli nr:> \Y<>ll in tlw case of Lil!yil'hite v. 
( , I 1 f' \ .·. '»') r;9 I) "d 11!';'"' llGO (193r::) · IJ (/Ill///, -t J IZ. ,)_,y, .)_ ·- .) / ;) • 
Tlw Pssential p]eltwnts of an equitable estoppel 
]Jp stnkd as follows: (1) there must be a 
fol."(' n·1Jre>sPntation or c:oncealment of material 
f11rfs; (:2) it must have been made with lrnowl-
Pdp:P, aetnal or ('Onstruetive, of the facts; (3) the 
iiart:· to whom it was made must have been with-
out know\('dgl' of or the duty of inquiring further 
to t hP rPal faets ; ( +) it must have been made 
\1 ith tlw intPntion it should he acted upon; and 
th<' party to whom it was made must have 
n·liPd on or aeted upon it to his prejudice. There 
c-an h<· no to•stoppel if any of these essentials are 
al>s(•nt. ( ftalies h.'' the court.) 
81'1 Ilru111Jlo11 I'. Parn11101111t Pictur('S Corp., 279F.2d100, 
10± l'ir.) cert. dc11ied, :1G-! U.S. 882 (19GO). 
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.. 
It should lw notl•d at tliis point that tl 1.c· doctrini· .. 
di 
estoppel is not favored by the courts. Set Beard t'. Jlri 
vin,, 60 Cal. App.2d 421, 140 P.2d 720, 726 (194;3); 8tnrk; 
v. Bottoms, 203 Tt>nn. 2;37, 310 S.\V.2d 451 (1958). 'l'hi 
judicial disfavor of the doctrine is reflected in the pro. 
cedural practice of requiring one relying upon estoppe: 
to bear the burden of proving all the essential element 
Baton Rouge Lumber Company v. Gurney, 173 So. 2d 
(La. Ct. App. 1965); Levy v. Bonfouca Him ting Cl11b, 1311 
So. 2d 567 (La. Ct. A pp. 1961). There is no t>vidence oi 
fraud or concealment of material facts in the rPcord of 
the instant case. Further, there is no Pvidence that the 
Grand Lodge of the BLF&E had knowledge of fact1 
which would justify an estoppel with regard to the "out-
side earnings" provision of the Constitution or am 
other element of plaintiffs' case. In addition, under thP 
cases previously cited, each member who joined th1· 
BLF&E is charged with a knowledge of what is con-
tained in the BLF&E Constitution. Amalgamated Cloth-
ing Workers i: Kiser, sitprn, at 564. At the very !Pal't. 
each member of the BLF&E had the duty of inquiring 
into the laws of the Brotherhood. As set forth in the 
preceding quote from the BLF&E Constitution, the law 
of the Brotherhood is abundantly clear with regard to 
this $150.00 per month outside earnings provision. The 
members who are now plaintiffs in this snit had knowl-
edge of the facts and therefore cannot make out an 
estoppel. As the Utah Supreme Court noted: 
One of the essential elements which must enfiir 
into and form a part of an equitable estoppel 
is that the truth concerning the facts relied upon 
by the person claiming the benefits of the estop-
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pel was unknown. Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 
:nG Pac. 912, 918 (1928). 
The burden of proving a lack of knowledge of the 
actual facts or lack of constructive knowledge of the 
actual facts foll upon plaintiffs in this lawsuit. Each of 
]ilaintiffs either possessed or had access to a copy of the 
Constitution of the BLF&E (R. 1060) and should have 
]wen aware of its provisions. Even if these members were 
not actually aware of the constitutional provisions, they 
were all chargeable with knowledge of the laws and 
general rult's of the organization which they had joined. 
Allen v. Southern Pacific Co., 166 Or. 290, 110 P.2d 923, 
(1941); Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Kiser, 
.mpra. 
Not only must the party seeking to claim estoppel 
prove the absence of knowledge of the actual facts, but, 
as noted in Lillywhite, supra, he must also prove his per-
sonal good faith reliance. Such reliance is negated when 
the party claiming estoppel has actual knowledge of the 
facts, Bradford v. Western Oldsmobile, I·nc., 222 Or. 
440, 353 P.2d 232, 238 (1960), or where such party is 
in possession of such facts as would put an ordinarily 
prudent person upon notice to make further inquiries. 
O'Malley 1:. U nitcd Producers and Consumers Co-opera-
hre, Tnc., 95 Ariz. 134-, 387 P.2d 1016, 1018 (1963); Mar-
shall L:. Bfnulict 161 Cal. App.2d 284, 326 P.2d 516, 519-20 
m.c. A pp. 1958). Sine<:> plaintiffs had access to facts 
which wonlcl have put a rPasonablc person on notice (the 
Constitution) they were chargeable with knowl-
edgP of the iiroYisions of the Constitution regarding out-
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sid(• earrnngs and tlwy eonld not possibJ_,,· kl\'(' Jiad lli, 
good-faith reliancP nPeessary to pstalilisl1 \'stopp(•l. Tlir. 
evidence of plaintiffs tlwmselves indicates that tlu.·r l· l 
.' ldf 
actual of the earnings provision. (R 
Each of the plaintiffs had \\·it11in l1is o\rn hands and hi, 
own power the facts which would lrnvP pn·nntr·ri 
any reliance on strikt• benPfits where ontsid<' 
exceeded $150.00 in any strikt> month. 'l1he eyidenei· 
adduced from some of the plaintiffs in tlw ca::w that t] 101 
were told by old members of the BLF&E that 11r11 
vision \vas never enforced cannot purport to bind thi· 
Brotherhood or serve as the basis for an Psto1ipel. S1"1' 
discussion, supra. 
Even if constitutional prov1s10ns could lw 1rnifrd, 
there is no evidence in this record to show a waiYer k 
defendants. The doctrine of waiver is generally defimd 
as the voluntary relinquishment of a known right. In 
Birkeland v. Corbett, 51 \Vash. 2d 55±, 320 P.2d 635, 
(1958), the Supreme Court of \Vashington stated that: 
A "waiver" is the intentional and volnntan 
relinquishmeint of a known right, or such con 
duct as warrants an inf ere nee of the relinquish· 
ment of such right. The person against Khorn a 
waiver is claimed must have hlfe11drd to relin-
quish i:he right, advantage, or benefit, and hi, 
actions must be inconsistent with anv other intrn· 
tion than to waive them. added.) 
See Constantino v. JJ!oreschi. 9 \Vash. 2d 638, 115 P.2<l 
955, 9Gl (1941). These cases indicate that waiver can only 
arise when there is a knowing relinquishnwnt. Tlwre ii 
aboslutely no evidence in the instant case indicatinp; that 
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tltc' Uranrl Lodg(• of tl1<• BLF&E or President Gilbert 
Lne\I that any of tlw nwmhers of the local who were re-
ceiving strih lwnefits earning in excess of $150.00 
per month. Absent such knowledge, there could be no 
waiver of the provision limiting benefits 
upon receipt of knowledge as to outside earnings. There 
is no evidence in this record regarding whether defend-
ants sought information as to earnings from those mem-
bers receiving lwnefits. Even if defendants did not seek 
information from those members, they are not pre-
cluded from limiting plaintiffs here since information 
regarding plaintiffs' outside earnings came to the atten-
tion of defendants. Custom or practice cannot change a 
nnion constitution. SC'e discussion, s1tpra, at 43-44. 
Siner the Constitntion of the BLF&E requires those 
earning in Pxcess of $1f:i0.00 iwr month to be removed 
from the strikP rolls by the President, the trial court 
c·rrecl in refusing to limit benefits as requested by de-
fendants. For this reason, the trial court should be re-
wnwd and the ease should be remanded. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING COUN-
SEL FOR PLAINTIFFS TO CIRCULARIZE POTEN-
TIAL PLAINTIFFS TO JOIN THE CLASS. 
On :May 9, 19GS, over objection of defendants (R. 
221-223), counsel for plaintiffs in this action sent notice 
nndPr their firm name and signature to a large nnmber 
of pott-ntial plaintiffs who had not intervened. This 
nohee reeifrcl approval through an order of the court 
Jllll\HH"tedly dat('CT May G, 1968, (R. 224-28) and was 
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sent to thirty-six ]Wrsons (H. 2:27-:28). As a n•snlt r
11 
this notice, at least ten plaintiffs intnTern:'cl C1rn 11 • }1111 
"Notice of .Joinder and Repre:sentation" filed Avril :ill, 
1968, (R. 197-206) 'with the final "Notice of .Toindei', 1 dl]1, 
Repn·sentation" filed 24, 1968, (R. 232-41). TJ
1
, 
suit had b<"en pending for approximately six at 
the time the notice was given and at that time only Bl 
plaintiffs had joined. It is apparent that the 
ten would not have joined but for the inYitation sent out 
by counsel for plaintiffs. 
Rule 23 of the Utah Code of Civil Procedure mah, 
no provision for notice to be given to potential plaintiff, 
This rule follows in substance the old Federal rule which 
also provided for no such notice. In the 1968 amendment) 
to the Federal Rules, Rn le 23 was changed to allow notice 
to be given in certain specified instances. Note>, howewr, 
that an explicit change was made in the Federal Rule' 
of Civil Procedure according to the legislature authorit1 
given to the Supreme Court in the Enabling Act, 
U.S.C.A. 2072, 2073). No such dmnge lias heen rnar!P 
in the Utah Rules. Consequrntly, an>' snch notice 1rn> 
contrary to the Rules, and thus was error on the part 
of the trial court. 
There are strong reasons of polic>' dietating that any 
change in thP Rules of CiYil Procedure should be ma<l1' 
according to the normal legislative and judicial chanmb. 
Absent such authority, the giving of notice of plaintiffs' 
counsel is not free from suspicion. In Cherner 1.:. Tra11si-
tron Electronics Cor17., 201 F. Supp. 934 (D . .Mass. 
Judge 'Vyzanski had the following very iwrtinrnt l'I'· 
marks to make about giving notice: 
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Ordinarily the primary duty of counsel is to 
hi;.: own client. His obligation, like that of hiS' 
cliPnt, may in come situations require him to give 
notice to other interests which may be adversely 
affected by his prosecution of his own client's 
of adion. But the bringing o.f the present 
s11it, and any preliminary proceedings in connec-
tion ·with the taking of evidence prior to judg-
ment cannot legally prejudice other sharehold-
ers 1\'110 might be in like case with his own client. 
Xu prcccd ent supports the suqgestion that plain-
tiffs or their counsel have a moral ditty to act 
us w1solicited clrnmpions of ·others. Without go-
ing so far as to agree with defendant's arguments 
that the proposed conduct of the plaintiffs or 
their counsel would be champertous or would vio-
late either Canon 27 or Canon 28 of the American 
Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics, 
this Court concludes that at the present stage of 
the controversy (when there is no more reason 
to accept as true plaintiff's declaration than de-
fondant's answers) Ride 23 sh01dd not be itsed "as 
a dei:icc to rnable client solicitation." 
* * * If this Court were to grant plaintiff's 
motion, the normal consequence would be that 
many persons would incorrectly infer that this 
Court regarded the plaintiff's complaint as prima 
facie well founded and had required a prompt 
notice to all 1vho had been victimized so that they 
might not by delay or inaction lose valuable 
rights. 
***Nor is it any pa.rt of this Court's duty 
to awaken anyone who is sleeping through the 
[Jf'.riod of limitati.on set by Congress. Moreover, 
it would not be appropriate for this Court to 
sound the alarm. (Emphasis added.) 
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ReP Escott I'. BarChris Const. Corp., 283 F. Supp.@, 
(8.D.N.Y. 19GS). Allowanep of snd1 solieitation ,, .. 1. , I < ]11)1 
within the discretion of the trial jndg-p and 1·t , . ' \\'()) 
prejudicial error for thP trial judg(' to allow nttnrn'"' 
for plaintiffs to solicit additional i1wrnhers of tlw ela«, 
to join as p1aintiffs. As stated in Escott v. Brir('/
1118 
Const. Corp., supra, at 70G: 
The only partieipanh; in tlw pn,sent action 11 1i 11 
would benefit by snch a course would he plain 
tiffs' att'orneys, who might expect a larger fo, 
There i::s no Utah precedent allff\ving· solicitation of 
members b:v plaintiffs in a class action. Tlw Rul('S of 
Civil Procedure allow no such action. As stated in t]:11 
cases cited, s11pra, sound judicial policy forbids such 
action. 
For the foregoing reasons, the case should be n-
versed or at least those plaintiffs who intervened as a 
result of the solicitation should not be allowed to recover 
in this action. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE MEASURE 
OF DAMAGES USED TO COMPUTE THE JUDG-
MENT. 
The proper measure should have been thP damagei 
proximately attributable to the plaintiffs' reliance npnn 
the actions of defendants' agents. 
As the record conclusively shows, the dL•ft'ndants' 
employees had no actual authority to bind the union in 
contract to pay strike benefits to these plaintiffs. An1 
52 
t]wnr,\' of reeovery 11rnst bt> based npon the apparent 
anthority of defendants' to bind the union by 
Uwir The doctrine of ap1mrent or ostensible 
anthority is dependent upon the establishment of an 
estoppel. Monte Carlo Motors, Inc. v. Volkswagenwerke, 
r;.JJ.B.!!., l Cal. Rptr. 920 (Cal. App. 1960); Mi1;rray v. 
Hills CalJ Compam1, 198 N.E.2d 46G (Ohio App. 1963); 
Zic Television Programs, I11c. v. Associated Grocers, Inc. 
of So11tl1 Carolina, 114 S.E.2d 82G (S.C. 1960); Pioneer 
Cosuulty Co. I'. Rlackicrll, 383 S.W.2d 216 (Texas C. 
App. 19(i4); Morris v. J. I. Case Credit Corporation, 411 
S.\V.'2<1 7s:1 (Texas C. App. 19G7). There is logic behind 
tliis approaeh. Tlw doctrine of apparent authority is 
j11stifo·d 11pon the ground that it is more equitable to 
]Jlaee th<> loss npon tlw party employing the person who 
11i:HlP tl1P than upon an innocent 
Ji<UlY i\'ho e<rnld g<'nnirn_.ly believe that the employee did 
lin1P t}ip antlwrity to makP the rwrtinent representations. 
lt is axiomatic-, however, that in cases of estoppel 
tlwre shonlcl lw some changt> of position on the part of 
the plaintiff 1d1id1 l<'ads to his damage. To establish 
au t-qnitable Pstoppel, the plaintiff must have injuriously 
changed his position. This change of position must result 
<lin'rtly from the actions of the defendant or the defend-
ant':,.: Sep cases cited at pp. 43-48, sitpra. 
In Rosto11 1.·. 1V,11coff, 4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P.2d 332 (1956), 
tliP ddt>1ulant had promisPd to rent certain premises to 
the l1lamtiff on the n•presPntation that he owned the 
Jll'Pllli:ses. l'lw deft>ndant did not own the premises and 
nnahlt> to thPm. As a result, plaintiff could 
wit lllo\ l' in on tlt<· agn·ed dafr. Later, plaintiff was able 
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to negotiate another, but far less fayorahlP, wit!i; 
trne owner. Plaintiff sued defendant baSf='d on a tli . 
f'11] 
of contract by estoppel. Tlw supreme conrt lwld lli:i 
the doctrine of estoppel could not apply. Plaintiff kt" 
not spent any money in reliance upon defendant's pronih 
to rPnt the premises to him; he had not changPd his 1111 ,i 
tion in any way in reliance upon defendant's promi,b 
All he had lost was the bargain that he thought he had 
made with the defendant. The court held that this wa.' 
not enough to justify the application of the e8t011 !J1,: 
doctrine. Another instructive case is Federal Finw1c, 
Co. v. Humiston, 404 P.2d 465 (Wash. 1965). This case 
involved an assignee's action on a conditional sales con-
tract. There was a total failure of consideration in ti:.· 
execution of the original contract. The court said that 
there could be no estoppel against the buyer unless the 
assignee could show that the assignor could have or would 
have been able to assert a defense against the original 
seller. Since the assignee could make no such showing, ' 
lie could not recover against the buyer even though 
the assignor had sold him a worthless conditional salP> 
contract. The court quite correctly pointed out that in 
this situation there was no way that the assignee's re-
liance on the actions of the assignor had damaged him, 
as he would have been in no different position against the 
original seller. 
There are virtually an endless number of anthoritiPs , 
for the proposition that the plaintiff, in order to take 
advantage of the doctrine of estoppel, must have sonw 
detrimental reliance upon the actions of the defendant 
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In Jl" 1 i11a i·. Ro1111ey, !)-± Ariz. -±0, 381 P.2d 581 (1963) 
i l·i· 1•1rn rt q nokd IY i th a ppron1l the following: 
TlH· e:-;:o:ential of estoppel are that 
plaintiff, "·ith knowledge of the facts, must have 
ass<'rted a particular right inconsistent with that 
ass<·rkd in thP instant action, to the prejudice of 
another icho has relied Hpon this first conduct .... 
Jf a.ny of these essential elements are lacking, 
tltl're is no estoppel. TVeiner v. Romley, supra, at 
;JS3. (Emphasis by the Court.) 
fn Gnrcio 1.'. Frey, 412 P.2d 159, 162 (N.M. 1968) the 
•.'otut said: "Ahst>nt reliance and injury, <'qnitahle estop-
prl is inapplicable." In Rheem Mmmfacturing Co. v. 
C;1ilcd States, 371 P.2d 578, 581 (Cal. 1962) the court 
:::tatPd: "1.'hrre can he no estoppel unless the party as-
st·rting it rPlied to his detriment on the conduct of the 
pNson to be estopped." 
j.pplying these general and valid principles of law 
11> tlw present casP, it is clear that the trial court wrong-
full: nwa,-.;nn·d the damages of the plaintiffs. To recover 
nm1er a theory of apparent authority, plaintiffs would 
havP to show estoppel. To prove estoppel they must 
pron• that because of the representations of defendants' 
vlaintiffa acted to their detriment. The only 
detrimental reliance of plaintiffs was that they 
.ioinPd the union. In order to recover strike benefits, 
tiw plaintiffs would have to show that because of defend-
ants' 1•mployees' representations they went out on strike. 
wne damaged by the strike, not by joining the 
union. ThPy were called on strike not by the defendants 
httt 1ly the International Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers 
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Un_1011. (R. Plaintiffs \\·cmld 11<\YP :;i 
strike 1..•ven if no representation as to strik<' bc·nf.•fi't .1 s rnrl 
been given by defendant:::;. Plaintiffs' argnment tliat lH' 
cause of tlw representations made by defendant"' a<· t 
• 
0 
they were injured. and as a result of such ini'nn· s]i l.' 
• • ' OU 11 
be• able to recover benefits cornpletdy fails in bii 
and in logic. The most that plaintiffs should lw ahlP lrr 
recover are those damages directly attrilmtahlP to tht·ir 
reliance upon representations by defendants' ('rnplo;:ei·'· 
The record is devoid of any eYidence of darnag'<'s whil'h 
are proximately attributable to plaintiffs' n·lianep l1)Jon 
the representations of defendants' agents. f-lincP plain. 
tiffs were only entitled to recover their reliancr damage, 
the judgment of the trial court is grossly excPssiw anrl 
must be reversed. The case should be remandPd to alloi1 
plaintiffs to prove reliance damage, if they havr any. 
Strong arguments of policy support the above re-
sult. As was mentioned earlier, the doctrine of ap1iamt 
authority is a means of protecting relying plaintiffs from 
injury and loss. The underlying theory is that \\'here 
people suffer injury due to their reliance on another's 
representations, that loss should fall upon those parties 
who made the representations or who were in control 
of those making the representations. It must be remem-
bered, however, that the parties being hdd liable are 
themselves not especially culpable. The courts use the 
doctrine of apparent authority only as a means of spread-
ing losses. In cases where there has been no dcrtimental 
reliance, it would be very unfair to bind principals for 
the unauthorized representations of their agent. rrhe 
only jm;tification for holding the principal liable is tl 11 
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damage suffered by plaintiff due to his reliance on what 
he believed to be authorized statements of the agent. 
Where there is no reliance damage there should be no 
recovery unless actual authority can be proved. There 
was no proof of actual authority in the instant case. To 
lwl<l that plaintiffs should recover strike benefits is to 
say that the defendants are bound on a contract of in-
f:lnrance by the unauthorized actions of their agents and 
that such a contract protects plaintiffs forever against 
whatever damage they may suffer no matter the source 
nf the damage. The statement of plaintiffs' position car-
rir·s its mvn refutation. 
POINT VIII 
THE EVENTS UPON WHICH THE COMPLAINT IS 
PREDICATED OCCURRED IN THE COURSE OF A 
LABOR REPRESENTATION CONTROVERSY THAT 
WAS SUBJECT TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELA-
TIONS ACT, AND THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF 
THOSE EVENTS MUST BE MEASURED BY THE 
FEDERAL ACT AND THE POLICIES THAT UN-
DERLIE THAT ACT. 
The eyents forming the basis for plaintiffs' com-
plaint occUtTPd in the following setting: The defend-
ant Brotherhood is an unincorporated association which 
has functioned as a national railway labor organization 
for the greater part of a century. In such capacity, 
prior to .June :10, 1967, the Brotherhood had been the 
e1TtifiPd bargaining representative of persons employed 
as locomotive engineers, trainmen and hostlers by Ken-
neeott 
K <'nTIProH is, of course, engaged in a business that 
nffeeb intrrstate commerce, and therefore its labor re-
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lations are subject to the National Labor H(•luti , . \ 
" 1·1 
of 1935 (29 U.S.C. §141,. l't. seq.) as re-enacted hy the 
Labor-:Management Rdahons Act ( Taft-11 arll<·y A('t) 
1
,r 
1947 and as last amended by the Lahor-1\f anag('lllrnt RP-
porting and Disclosures Act (Landrum-Griffi11 Art) 
1
,f 
1959 (29 u.s.c. §401). 
The plaintiffs, and other employees totalling some 
900 persons, were included in a collective-hargaini11g- milt 
for which the International Union of Mine, Mill and 
Smelter Workers had been, since 1943, certified hy the 
National Labor Relations Board (herein called NLRB) 
as bargaining representative. 
In September, 1966, this unit (herein called "truck 
haulage unit") included a number of persons who haJ 
previously been employed at Kennecott as locomotive 
firemen and engineers. Because of dissatisfaction bv 
such individuals and others within the truck haulage 
unit with the representation provided by l\iine-1\fill, a 
campaign was instituted in which the Brotherhood 
sought the truck haulage unit bargaining rights. 
During this election campaign, one of the field rep· 
resentatives of the Brotherhood arrogated to himself 
control of the campaign. He then proceeded to instruct 
the other representatives that according to his interpre-
tation of Article 10, Section 3 of the Brotlwrhood Con-
stitution, those employees within the truck haulage unit 
who joined the Brotherhood would be entitled to recei1e 
strike benefits whenever they participated in a strike 
against Kennecott. Late in the election campaign, he 
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made the representation that such Brother-
hood benefits would he due them regardless of the out-
eome of the forthroming NLRB election. 
rriie NLRB Pleetion was conducted on June 21 and 
22, 1967. Out of the 926 employees eligible to vote, 250 
·nited in favor of the Brotherhood and 510 voted for the 
competing union which consisted of Mine-Mill as merged 
with the United Steelworkers of America. 
We respectfully suggest that the lower court should 
have declined jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' complaint 
beranse the subject matter of the complaint is a phase 
of labor relations that has been preempted by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (herein called "NLRA") (29 
r.S.C. et. seq.). To the extent that legal conse-
que11ccs attach to campaign promises by representatives 
of ln·l){)r irnio11s, prrliminary to the holding of represen-
totion elections, coutrol over that subject has bee.n vested 
l1y Congrrss in the NLRB with judicial review being 
lodged in the United States Coitrt of Appeals and the 
Siiprcnu' Court (29 U.S.C. 159 and 160). Clearly, the 
activtties upon which the plaintiffs' action rests in this 
case occurred in the course of, and were a direct con-
sequence of, campaign tactics in the context of a repre-
sentation election. 
Vi11en Congress resolved in 1935 to establish a sys-
tem of rules and policies to regulate labor relations 
Ldween employers and employees engaged in interstate 
conuuercp, the plan of regulation as it emerged in the 
form of the NLRA basically divided the field of em-
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ployer-employee relations into the followinrr r11·1'r . 
i-. ieipal 
areas: ( 1) The Section 7 rights of emplovees to Lnr· · • " bane 
or not to engage in concerted activity and to fret>ly ,;t. 
termine their collective-bargaining representatiw if'. 
' . Ull\, 
(29 U.S.C. §157); (2) Prohibiting ernployen; and 
unions from engaging in unfair lahor a> ]irr' 
vided in Setcion 8 of the Act (29 U.S.C. §158: (3) Thr· 
enforcement of employer and employee and dntii". 
as established by collective-bargaining Jllll 
suant to Section 301 (29 U.S.C. ). 
The results of this statute, beginning with the in. 
terpretation by the Supreme Court of the United 
in the case of Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 
353 U.S. 448 (1957) has been the development of a n011 
body of Federal substantive law fashioned from the rules 
and policies enunciated by the national labor acts. 
The justification for developing a new body oi 
Federal substantive law governing the enforcement of 
collective-bargaining agreements is the tendency of a 
system of Federal law to promote uniform rights and 
obligations. This need has been declared many time1 
by the Supreme Court. We cite as an illustration the 
case of Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffers, Wareho11semt1 1 
H elpPrs v. Litcas Flour Co., 3G9 U.S. 95, 102-04 (19621. 
In that case, the Supreme Court stated: 
* * * We hold that in a case such as this, inrom· 
patible doctrines of local law must give way fo 
principles of federal labor law .... 
The importance of the area which w?uld lw 
affected by separate systems of suhstanhvr la\\ 
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mahs tli<· n<>ed for a single body of federal law 
particularly eo.mp<'_l1ing. The ordering and adjust-
ing of eornp<>tmg mterests through a process of 
free and voluntary collective bargaining is the 
krvston0 of the f scheme to promote indus-
tri.al pt>aC'P. State law which frustrates the efforts 
of Congr(>ss to stimulate the smooth functioning 
of that proc<'ss thus strikes at the very core of 
frderal labor policy .... With due regard to the 
many factors which bear upon competing state 
arnl fedPral interests in this area, California v. 
Zook, 33G U.S. 725, 730-31, 69 S.Ct. 841, 843-44, 
9;3 LJ£d. 1005; Rice 1'. Fe Elevator Corp., 
331 218, 2;30_;31, 67 S.Ct. 11-lG, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 
1+-1-7, we eannot but conclude that in enacting 
Congn•ss intended doctrines of federal labor 
lm'T uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local 
The further fruition of the Congressional intention 
for a ne1\ body of industrial law to develop and mature 
i; illustrated in the case of San Diego Building Tra!des 
(01u1cil v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). In that case 
tlw California Supreme Court had sustained the judg-
ment of tlH' court below which had enjoined the union 
from picketing and had awarded resulting damages to 
tl1p employer. 
r:I'he Supreme Court of the United States granted 
CPrtiorari and reversed, holding that the mere fact that 
the had declined to assert jurisdiction over the 
(liti]mte (heeanse of insufficient impact on interstate 
eo1nrn(·rce) did not leave the state free to regulate activi-
ties that had been preempted by Federal law. We quote 
a part of thP court's explanation as follows: 
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To the National Labor Relations. Hoard and : 
must left those JH'PC'lSP and <·llj,,: 
hm1ted demarcations that can be adequatply 1" 
ioned only by legislation and administrati<;n. 
been with the 11 ,,1:1 
hal conflict of two law-Pnforcrng , . 
the disharmonies inherent in two system,'. 
1
1;, 
federal the other state, or inconsistent standrn,;. 
of substantive law and diff Pring l'('llH·di 
schemes. Bitt the 'ltnifying consideration of 11 • 
decisions has been regard to the fact that (\, 
gress has e.ntrusted administra.tion of the Irr!. 
policy for the Nation to a centralized ad miJ1islin 
tive agency, armed with its own procedures, 11 1,, 
equipped with its specialized knowledge and c11 1,. 
ulative experience: 
" ... Congress evidently considered that c11 
tr.alized administration of specially-desig111 
procedures was necessary to obtain unifom 
application of its substantive rules and : 
avoid these diversities and conflicts likely t 
result from a variety of local proced11res 01111 
attitu.des towards labor oontroversies. • '· 
A multiplicity of tribunals and a diverfiJ·, 
of procedures are quite as apt to prod11r 
incompatible or conflicting adjudications 1:· 
to different rules of substantiv(' lmY. ;: · 
Garner v. Teamsters, etc. Union, 346 
490-91, 75 S.Ct. 161, 165, 98 L.Ed. 228. 
San Diego B1tilding Trades Cowncil v. GarnuJ' 
s1tprn., at 242-43. (Emphasis added.) 
Such preemption is further demonstrated in a ca· 
in which the Supreme Court held that a dispute must i 
considered to be beyond the state's jurisdiction to enk 
tain if the conduct involved in the litigation is condut 
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, iiat "arguably" subject to the jurisdiction of the 
\I.RB, Lncul 100 of United Ass'n of Journeymen amd 
itilil"i11lices i;. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963). In that de-
.1,1011 tile Court stated: l ' ' 
rn·ed not and should not now consider 
wltdlier the petitioner's activity in this case was 
fod('rally protected or prohibited, on any of the 
th<·ories suggested above or on some different 
basis. It is sufficient for present purposes to 
find, as we do, that it is reasonably "arguable" 
that thP matter comes within the Board's juris-
1liction. 
* * * 
Nor do ·we regard it as significant that 
Borden's complaint against the union sounded in 
contract as vYell as in tort. It is not the label 
affixed to the cause of action under state law 
that controls the determination of the relation-
sli ip between state and federal jurisdiction. 
Rath<>r, as stated in Garmon, supra, 359 U.S., at 
'.2-l-(i, 79 S.Ct. at 780, 
"[OJur concern is with delimiting areas of 
conduct which must be free from state regu-
lation if national policy is to be left unham-
pered." 
Local 100 of the United Ass'n of Jo11.rneymoo wnd 
AzJprcnticcs v. Borden, sitpra, at 696, 698. (Em-
phasis added.) 
\Ve believe the above discussion with reference to 
the i.;radual preempetion during the past twenty-five 
.1 t·ar . ;; is essential to an understanding of the reasons 
why, and the methods by which, the Federal government 
!in-: assnmed virtually total regulatory control, to the 
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exclusion of the state 0trovt>rn1nents, 1 t· •" a ior.s )J,, 
tween employers and employees. 
Being realisticallv aware of such transfoniiet' 
• "11111 
on<' can hardly fajl to sense the conflict hPtwePn a .1, ' ' a\I' 
assuming jurisdiction over an action of the kind in 
1111 
instant case and the administrative plan }lronrnlg-atr,,1 
by Congress in §§9 and 10 of the NLRA. 
The authority of the NLRB to ascertain with 
finality whether a union ha:s the right to bargain 
behalf of a group of employees is spelled out in 
of the Act. Such authority is premised upon a filing or 
a petition by a group of employees, a union or an em. 
ployer. Upon its receipt the Act provides that the 1"LRB 
shall "investigate" and make a determination so as tn 
assure that the employees have a truly free choice in 
selecting what, if any, collective-bargaining representa. 
tive they de'sire for an appropriate 
unit. 
After the NLRB has issued a certification as lo 
the results of an election, the opportunity for judicial 
review of the organizing tactics used by the unions anil 
the certification does arise if the NLRB has occasiun 
to subsequently issue an order directing the employer 
to meet and bargain with the certified union in accord· 
ance with §10( c) of the Act (29 U.S.C. c) ). 
In this judicial review, the whole NLRB recnrJ 
developed during the investigation becomes a part ui 
the record upon which an order to cease or desist frorn 
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an unfair labor practice is predicated by the NLRB. 
Thi;:; is accomplished hy W(d) of the Act (29 U.S.C. 
H59(d) ). One(• the Board issues such an unfair labor 
practice order, the gate is open for aggrieved parties to 
obtain judicial review hy the United States Court of 
;\ and a second review by the Supreme Court 
pursuant to f) of the Act (29 U.S.C. §160(f) ). 
On the hasis of the authority granted and the pro-
cechue pn•scrihed hy and 10 of the NLRA, it is 
c·h·ar that Congress intended there should be a minimum 
of gowrm1wntal n·gnlation of the election tactics used 
and that such regulation he vested exclusively, in the 
fust instam·P, in the NLRB with the limited judicial 
hy tltE'. Federal Court of Appeals under §lO(f) 
of tlw Ad. This conclusion was affirmed by the Su-
Jireme Conrt in Boin: v. GrcyhoU!Yld Corporation, 376 
r .S. ±00 ( 19G-l). 
ConnsPl for dt>fendants, in preparing this brief, have 
made an exhaustive search of the court decisions in an 
t-ffort to find a precedent for the plaintiffs' case. We 
have found no surh precedent. If the theory upon which 
the plaintiffs ])]"edicate their action is sound, one should 
r\i:srover precedents by the score for plaintiffs' action. 
'l'lrnt \\'Ould he true simply because it is a fact of com-
1non know1Nlge in the field of labor relations that great 
11mnlH·rs of n·presPntation disputes have been devel-
oped during the vears since the enactment of the NLRA 
:irnl t11at representatives of the union, whether they are 
c·ngngPd in an election contest 1vith an employer or in 
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a competitive effort with another union are not ,. . . · -01wu& 
lavish (or loose) m the promises that they make. 
The reason for no such precedents is that such Br· 
tjon, if proper, would have the effoct of nullifying· 
111 
overriding the Congressional intention that the ad.min],,_ 
trative regulation of such contests shall be preempter! 
by the Federal law. 
If the courts of fifty states were pennitted to en. 
tertain suits sounding in contract or in tort, based upon 
the promises or activities during election 
the inevitable result would be a state of chaos and con. 
fusion in the field of labor relations. 
In 1966, the Supreme Court of the United State1 
decided Linn v. Unite.d Plant Guard Workers, Local 114. 
383 U.S. 53 (1966). The principal question therein pre-
·sented might be thought to paralle] that raised by thP 
complaint in the instant case. Careful examination, ho11 
ever, shows that such case is no precedent for the reliei 
now sought by the plaintiffs. In the Linn case, 
were sought in a civil action for libel instituted rwder 
state law by an employer subject to the NLRA for 
libelous union statements published during a union or-
ganization campaign. The complaint was dismissed hy 
the United States District Court and such finding was 
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court 
in reversing the Court of Appeals, explained its ach 111 
as follows: 
In the light of these considerations it 
that the exercise of state jurisdiction here wonl1' 
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lie a peripheral concern of the Labor 
J\I anagement Relations Act," provided it is lim-
iterl to redressing lihel issued with knowledge of 
its falsity, or with reckless disregard of whether 
it true of false. Moreover, we believe that 
''an overriding state interest" in protecting its 
residents from malicious libels should be recog-
nized in these circumstances. This conclusion i.s 
buttressed by our holding in United Construction 
Workers v. Laburnwn Construction Corp., 347 
U.S. 656, 7 4 8.'Ct. 833, 98 L.Ed. 1025 (1954) .... 
Linn v. United Plant Gitard Workers, supra, at 61. 
'rhe Court, however, after noting the basis for state 
court relief, 
In order that the recognition of legitimate state 
int0rests does not interfere with effective admin-
istratjon of national labor policy the possibility 
of such consequenees must he minimized. 1{\T e, 
ther<-'fore, limit the availability for state remedies 
for lilit->1 to those instances in whi0h the complain-
ant can show that the defamatory statements were 
!'irculated with malice and caused him damage. 
(Emphasis added.) Linn v. United Plant Guard 
Workers, supra, at 64-65. 
The Court went on to further emphasize these consider-
:=1tions as stated in Garrison v. Loitisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75: 
" LT] lie use of the known lie as a tool is at once 
at odds with the premises of democratic 
rnent and with the orderlv manner in which eco-
nomic, social or political change is to be effected." 
We believe that under the rules laid down here 
it can be appropriately redressed without cur-
tailment of state libel remedies beyond the actual 
nePds of national labor policy. However, if ex-
prricncP shows that a greater curtailment, even 
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n 011c, slw11ld lie 111·ccss11nf fl) Jncr,. 1 t f l 1
. II ,, 
J>C1ir111e11 _o t mt Ji;! ICIJ. t_l11' Court 11"ill /,, 1,. 
to reco1u-udl'r f.oda Ifs lwld111r1. lF1· rln1{ li,. . . . ( 11' 11r 1 
ll"ifli a co11stit1rtio11al is,,·11e l!llf sol!'/11 will 
1
.'' 
l l . . , I /i c eqree to w 11cl1 state re111ed1es li111·1· /Ji'i·i 




TVork1Ts, s111Jrn, at ()/. (Ernpha:si:s a<l<l<·(l.) 
1 
In Li1111, the court made it elt>ar that it was 
11111 
intending to open the door for all sort:s of state action.'. 
There is nothing in such d<"cision to imply a right (,
1 
enforce contractual remedies ari :sing out of an allegeil 
electionering off l'r hy tlw l'l'l)I'Psentative of a union anil 
an alleged ac<'eptance by the employes. If each of t'11 
states is to be free to apply its own eontraetual dortri 11 ,., 
to the vital area of union orgtwizational pffort,, tJ1, 
rC'sults could he catastrophic .• Just as in the instant case, 
any Prroneous, allwit honest, representation by a uniou 
organizer could expose the union aml its membersh11· 
funds to a statP claim for damages. Every time a labnr 
organization successfully gained the n•pn·s1,ntati1111 
rights for a bargaining unit of <·mploy<'<'!:'. its n:· 
failure thereaftf'r in achiPving its campaip;n Jll'Pclidt(111, 
of employment gains could be subject to a suit for failm1 
to perform. 
ThPre is little question that had tlw BLF&E been 
successful in winning- tlw K<'nnPcott NLRB <>l('dio11, an; 
misrPprrsentation of its organii<·rs could haw 
in having tlw election set aside. By the NLRB prn('en· 
ures tlw BLF&J<J would thus have bern deniPd the 
of its election victory hPcanse of suC'h conduct. Tins i· 
the type and the of regulation desigrn'<l arnl llP1•1nc·,: 
G8 
;![ntar:--· by CongTPs:-;. Tf t11is type of action relied upon 
11" tlie plaintiffs i:-; sm;tairn,d, then freedom of discus-
,;011, persuasion and argument during a NLRB repre-
,,1.11t;1tion dedion as eontPmp]ated by the NLRA would 
lw ckstroYed. 'To t<•:-;t :-Jtwh c-onduct by the ordinary con-
cepts of ('Ontrnd ]aw is as much out of step in this 
inslane<' as i11 tl1e <·as1· of a s11cee;.;sor corporation's obliga-
tinn to arhitrate. Jnl111 lVilcy d'; Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 
Tili F.S. 5-l-3 ( 10G-l-). In addition to its effect upon 
i·ledion cnnduet, it SPriously impede the union's 
;iliilit:-· to lafrr compromise and accommodate its bar-
!.!ai11i11g· position. Rather than reach a settlement at a 
] 1,nl l<'ss than it had earlier envisioned, the union would 
li1' compPllPd to resort to strikes. 
Tlw aetivitiPs of def t>ndants in the instant case did 
rnJt occur in a vacnmn. 'Tlw t>mployees of a major in-
Pntf>1·prise sueh as Kennecott have long been 
rn1·u1IJPrc-: nf or associated with labor unions. There are 
<1111m1xi11iatel:--· ninetePn stiparate labor organizations or 
n•prese11tatives of various units of Kenne-
r1itt cnq1lo.\"l·1•c-:. 1'1w::-:P Pmployees have long been exposed 
l" an<l an· familiar witl1 union organizational and repre-
functions. They must be deemed sophisticated 
::u11l fnll.v mnuP of tlw nature of electioneering promises 
rnarle Jiy unions during a representational campaign. It 
is cmnpktely nm·Palistie for them now to attempt to 
t<1kr· ont of eontPxt onP particular campaign promise and 
tn dP\'at<· it to an enforcoable contractual right. 
\rp re::-:11r>etfnlly snhmit that thP plaintiffs' complaint 
:;] 1<111 ld not lw PntntainPd by either state or Federal 
G9 
courts, because the authority vested in the NLRB Li 
and. 10 of the Act dearly indicates that Congre;, 
did not mtend that the campaign tactics indulg"d · 
1 c in 1·1 
unions during organization drives preceding rerire · sen. 
tution elections should be "regulated" by the states bi 
permitting such tactics to be made the subject of action', 
in state courts based upon the common law of 
and agency. 
POINT IX 
THE PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE 
A CLAIM AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS UPON 
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED UNDER SEC-
TION 501 OF THE L.M.R.D.A. 
The above contention is based principally upon 
of the Labor-Management Reporting and Dif. 
closure Act of 1959 (29 U.S.C. §501). 
The plaintiffs are subject to §501 because they come 
'vithin the definition of "employee" as set forth in 
of the Act (29 U.S.C. §402(f) ). Section 50l(a) read' 
as follows: 
The officers, agents, shop stewards, anJ 
other representatives of a labor organization oc-
cupy positions of trust in relation to sue? organ 
ization and its members as a group. It 1s, thm 
fore, the duty of each snch per;:;on, int 1i 
account the special problems and of <1 
labor organization, to hold its money a11d_ pr111 
erty solely for the benefit of the orgamznlin! 
and its members and to manage, invest, amd er 
pend the same in accordance with its constit1d!o 11 
and bylaws and any resolutions of the 
bodies adopt<:>d thereunder .... (Emphasis added· 1 
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The primary evil at which that statute is directed 
manifestly the embezzlement and other unlawful use 
of lUtion funds by union officials. But the literal lan-
g-uage of the statute forbids union officials from using 
or expending union funds in any manner that is "not in 
11 ccordancc with its constitution and bylaws." 
Thus, Federal law precludes state courts and juries 
f rorn compelling union officers to use union funds for 
purposes or in any manner that is not consistent with 
the union's constitution. This view is supported by ob-
made hy the United States District Court in 
the case of Highway Truck Drivers and Helpers, Loo(J)l 
ll!'l 'V. Cohen, 182 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1960). 
r:I'he complaint in the Cohen case sought a prelimi-
uary injunction to prohibit the officers of Local 107 
frnm nsing union funds to defray the legal costs of 
d('fending the officers in the criminal and civil actions 
hronght against them in the courts of Pennsylvania. 
ThP principal question presented was whether the ex-
pcnditurp of union funds to pay legal fees to defend the 
officers of Local 107 was improper in light of the pro-
hihition s contained in of the Act, notwithstand-
ing the expenditure was authorized by resolution of 
the union mf'mbership passed at a regular union meeting. 
The ultimate decision reached was that the expendi-
ture authorized by the resolution was beyond the power 
of l iocial 107 to make. Accordingly, the expenditure was 
deemPd an improper use of union funds and, hence, was 
'4 Yiolation of (a) of the Act. The district court's 
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decision was ::iJfirrned ln' th<> Court of' .\Jill<"tl · 1. • ( ;..; fl]' 1, 
Third Circuit (:28-± F.:!d 1 aml tli1• (' , 
l 111:1 
deniPd certiorari (3G5 U.S. 83:3). 
Tlw pertinent provisions of the' Brotherhood'·· c· 
fil 
stitution pertaining to strike benefits are contained 
1 
the paragraphs that comprise Article 10, NPction;}," 
the Constitution. Paragraph (a) of Nection 3 is a tor. 
trolling provision and reads as follows : 
The rate of pay to each memhPr and ni:r: 
member engaging in a. legal strikr authoriz/il ;,, 
this organiz.ation shall lw three dollars ($3.1n1 
per calendar day .... (Emphasis addPd.) 
Paragraph ( e) of Articl\' 1 O. S<·etion 3, is al:;o a 111 
provision in the Brotherhood's law. It reads as follow'. 
The provisions of this Section conePrning :!· 
payment of strikt> benefits are onlp11,, 
shall not be tlw basis of any legal liability on ti, 
part of the Brotherhood .... 
The Brotherhood's field representative during tl1° 
election campaign announced that his interpretation 
Article 10, Section 3, would entitle thm;e employees 11it:: 
in the truck haulagr unit who became memhrrs of t11 
Brotherhood during the organization campaign to rPcei11 
strike benefits regardless of whether the Brotherhor1' 
lost thr election. That interpretation manifestly mei] 
that the Brotherhood would pay strike benefits to !Ii 
plaintiffs notwithstanding the Brotherhood did not an 
thorize the strike and had no control ovPr it, and re,Q"aril 
less of the cause of the strike or the nature of the dispur' 
that led to the strike. 
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Patently, the interpretation placed on Article 10, 
Sretion 3i of the Con::>titution by such field representa-
tin: calls for the payment of strike benefits to members 
un<ler circumstances not mdhorized by the language of 
tlic Constitutron. 
rrherdore, if tlw President and the Finance Com-
rnitter of tlw Brotherhood were to formally authorize 
thr payment of ::;trik0 benefits to persons, either mem-
bers or non-mL'mhers, ,,-ho are engaged in a strike which 
the Brotherhood did not call, and over which it has no 
control, such US<' of Brotherhood funds, although au-
thorized by the top finaneial officers of the Brother-
hood, 1rnuld lie a Yiolation of (a) of the Reporting 
and Disclosure Act, and hence, would be an unlawful 
nsr of Brotherhood funds. (Exhibit D-136.) 
Defendants do not believe the prohibition m §501 
against the use of union funds for a purpose for bidden 
h>- Article 10, Section 3, of the Brotherhood's Consti-
t11tion can lw disrqrnnlt>d by any person, or by a Broth-
nhood officer, nor may it be disregarded by any court 
M jury Thr Federal law in §501(a) must be deemed 
c·0ntrolling over all persons and all state authorities. 
For that reason. 'In' respectfully submit that the plain-
tiffs' complnint fails to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted. 
CONCLUSION 
rc1w judgment below should be reversed because the 
findings of fact upon which that judgment is based are 
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1101 snpJH>rt<'<l h>· tltt> <'vid<'lH'<>. Ev(•Jl if th , 1.. . OSfl tn1\111: 
W!'l'<' support<'d h>· the p\·id<'IH'<' tht> J.U<l<rment ·] ]' • • 1-1 . rnu ,1, 
l'<'Vl'l's<'d lH'eaus<>, as a rnatt<•r of law, any emitt·"···· ,.'" 
• 1l! ]'I 
strikP lH'n<'i'its to 1ltl'SP plaintiffs \\"as 11/tru 1 in.: 
urnon <·onstitution and <·onld not llf· h·1-:!•<l 111 . ' . Jon a1· 
ag-Pnry. irnpliPd anthorit>·, apparPnt authority or ra; 
fieation tlH'ory, and lweausp th<' eourts should not int., 
pre.t a union constitution where valid provisions for r: 
interpn'tation an' provided tlwrPin. 
Further, ddt>ndants havP not waived their right, 
limit strik<' lwnPfits to thosp months in whieh tlw strilr 
<'HrnPd lt>ss than $lf)O.OO from outsidP sourees, nor" 
tlH•y Pstopp<'<l from assPrting- tll<' lirnitation. Tlw tr 
<'ourt <'JTPcl in failing to so lilllit tht> benefits. fa'. 
a:-:smning- that dalllag-<'s WPn' n'em·prahl<· by the pla1: 
tiffs. tlw trial court PIT<'d in allowing counsel for plair 
tiffs to eircnlariz<' potPntial plaintiffs to join the cla· 
and furtht->r Prr<'d in tht> measurP of damages usrrl: 
('(1lllputc• tll<' jndgirn•nt. 
In a<ldition, tlu• jndg-11wnt lwlow should hr 
lH•cans<• tll<' eonrt had no jnrisdirtion over the subjlf· 
rnattPr, plaintiffs fail<·<l to Pxhanst tlwir intr 
union r<'lllPdies. 'rh<' trial eourt also lacked jurisdictir1r 
ovPr th<' suhjPct matter of this action since the ewn'· 
upon which thP suit is based occurred in the context of: 
National Labor Relations Board supervised union elf, 
tion and the regulation of such union activity is pr' 
Pmptt>d by Ft>deral law. Moreover, the expenditure r: 
union funds is govt>rrn•d by of the Labor-ManaL'e 
!iwllt lfrportrnµ; and Disclosure Act which forbids pay-
1111 nt ril' ,.tnkP lwnPfits contra the constitutional provi-
c;on" d tliP nnion. lnkq)retation of is a question 
1'1Parh p1·(·e111vted hy Federal law and the state court 
111 U1out .1urisdiction in the matter. 
For tli1, forpgoing reasons, defendants respeotfully 
snhrnit that tlw ;judgment entered by the trial court 
slwnld la: reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
:MULLINER. PRINCE & MANGUM 
ROBERT M. YEATES 
Dl•JNIS R. 
Attorneys For Defendants-
Appellants 
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